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
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THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SCHOPENHAUER
IN ITS RELATION TO HIS SYSTEM OF
METAPHYSICS.

BY

CARRIE ELIZABETH LOGAN, PH. D.

*A Thesis for the Doctorate accepted by the Faculty
of New York University, June 1902.*

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La vray science et le vray etude de l'homme c' est l'homme.

—Charron.

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
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PREFACE.

The bibliographical list and certain long quotations from the text of Schopenhauer and Kant have been omitted, and an essay on "The Importance of Will from the Standpoint of Schopenhauer" added. Otherwise the copy remains as accepted by the Faculty of New York University.

C. E. L.

May 1903.



CONTENTS.

INTRODUCTION.

THE RELATION OF SCHOPENHAUER TO KANT.

CHAPTER I.

THE KANTIAN SOURCES OF THE PROBLEMS OF SCHOPENHAUER.

1. A comparison of the respective views of Kant and Schopenhauer regarding psychology.
2. Kant's great question, compared with the problems to which Schopenhauer addresses himself; knowing a world of concrete realities, where is the transition to a world of infinite realities.
3. The extent of Kant's influence upon Schopenhauer in the formation of his conception of psychology.

CHAPTER II.

AN INVESTIGATION OF SCHOPENHAUER'S CLAIM TO HAVE EXTENDED THE KANTIAN SYSTEM.

1. The inquiry conducted from a psychological standpoint.
2. Schopenhauer's determination of the nature of the unknown quantity in which the Kantian system ended.
3. A personal view of Schopenhauer's claim to be a successor of Kant.

CHAPTER III.

THE FEATURES OF THE KANTIAN AND SCHOPENHAUER SYSTEMS WHICH MAKE DEVELOPMENT INTO A SCHOOL OF THOUGHT POSSIBLE.

1. A comparison of the two systems with reference to the psychological background.
2. The mental processes by which we can reach reality.
3. The basis of the development of a school of thought with an inquiry as to why the Kantian system is fruitful and wherein lies the richness of the Schopenhauer system.

PART I.

BEGINNINGS OF THE WORLD AS WILL AND IDEA.

CHAPTER I.

SCHOPENHAUER'S IMPERSONAL WORLD GROUND AND ITS PSYCHOLOGICAL BASIS.

1. Will as the ground of all phenomena.

2. Will as blind force in nature.
3. The psychological cause of the failure of Schopenhauer to ground the nature of things in his posited reality.

CHAPTER II.

THE ORIGIN OF FEELING AND ITS DEPENDENCE ON WILL.

1. Dependence of feeling on volition.
2. Psychology of desire.
3. World values in terms of feeling.

CHAPTER III.

THE DAWN OF INTELLIGENCE.

1. The mirror of the will.
2. Self-consciousness and objective consciousness as correlative terms.
3. Contradictions in Schopenhauer's system showing the substitution of conscious activity as a world-ground.

PART II.

DEVELOPMENT OF WILL AND IDEA.

CHAPTER I.

SCHOPENHAUER'S ESTIMATE OF MENTAL MECHANISM. SHOWING THE STATE OF PSYCHOLOGY IN HIS DAY.

1. The field of preception in which are adjusted spatial and temporal relations.
2. The rise of the concept.
3. The doctrine of the categories in Kant and in Schopenhauer.
4. The function of understanding; the relation of cause to effect.
5. Reason.

CHAPTER II.

THE EVOLUTION OF RATIONAL WILL.

1. Schopenhauer's will theory.
2. The inner necessity for the objectification of the will.
3. A comparison of the respective views of Kant and Schopenhauer on the doctrine of the will.
4. A criticism of Schopenhauer's views concerning the will in the light of voluntaristic psychology.

CHAPTER III.

THE SECESSION OF FEELING FROM WILL.

1. Schopenhauer's anticipation of the theory of evolution.
2. Development of feeling.
3. Feeling freed from will in æsthetics.

4. The psychological ground of the æsthetical feeling.
5. The derivation of æsthetical experience.
6. The nature of æsthetical satisfaction.

CHAPTER IV.

THE EVOLUTION OF THE IDEA.

1. How will breaks itself up in terms of ideas.
2. The idea as a complicated brain-process.
3. Plato's doctrine of ideas and its influence on Schopenhauer.
4. Schopenhauer's theory of art.

CHAPTER V.

THE RATIONAL WILL.

1. The rise of the will above the sensuous feelings.
2. Character, the highest outcome of the rational will.
3. Schopenhauer's view of virtue.
4. Æsthetics supersede ethics in his system.
5. An inquiry as to whether Schopenhauer's will in action is identical with the will in the world.
6. Facts in experience which raise the question of the freedom of the will.
7. The fate of the doctrine of the freedom of the will in the works of Schopenhauer.

PART III.

THE OUTCOME OF SCHOPENHAUER'S SYSTEM.

CHAPTER I.

PESSIMISM IN SCHOPENHAUER'S SYSTEM.

1. The psychological ground of pessimism.
2. General conditions of pessimism.
3. Pessimism as a foundation for a system of ethics.
4. An inquiry as to whether Schopenhauer has proved the world to be evil.

CHAPTER II.

PANTHEISM IN SCHOPENHAUER'S SYSTEM.

1. The psychological ground of pantheism.
2. Schopenhauer's discovery of the noumenon.
3. Is this will, pure being, which is impossible?
4. General conditions of pantheism.
5. The relation between pessimism and pantheism.
6. Pantheism as a foundation for an ethical system.
7. The relation between æsthetics and pantheism.
8. The subject of pain and pleasure psychologically investigated.

CHAPTER III.

SCHOPENHAUER'S IDEALISM.

1. As related to metaphysics.
2. The psychological view-point.
3. Epistemological view-point.
4. Its harmony with the rest of his system.

CHAPTER IV.

THE FATE OF THE THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE IN SCHOPENHAUER'S SYSTEM.

1. Knowledge, a mere accident in explanation.
2. Relation of pantheism to the theory of knowledge in general and to that of Schopenhauer's system in particular.

CHAPTER V.

A CRITICISM OF SCHOPENHAUER'S DOCTRINE OF REALITY WITH A VIEW TO EXPOSING HIS INCONSISTENCIES.

1. The psycholocial ground of Schopenhauer's system.
2. Doctrine of the Absolute.
3. Schopenhauer's agnostical interpretation of self-consciousness.
4. Cause or substance needed?
5. Conscious activity substituted as a world-ground.
6. Schopenhauer's elimination of the factor of teleology.
7. Schopenhauer's views submitted to the test of modern voluntaristic psychology.

INTRODUCTION.

THE RELATION OF SCHOPENHAUER TO KANT.

CHAPTER I.

THE KANTIAN SOURCES OF THE PROBLEMS OF SCHOPENHAUER.

Arthur Schopenhauer, without conscious intent, based his system on the bed-rock of psychology, and had he built more carefully, the storms of criticism could not have prevailed against it. To locate Schopenhauer chronologically, it is necessary to place him some distance from Kant, when post-Kantian speculation had exhausted itself. In order of philosophical growth he closely followed his great master.

Schopenhauer developed his system on lines that originated in and emanated from the labors of Kant. The problems of both philosophers are metaphysical. All such problems take their rise in psychology, which is at once their source and a contributor to their solutions. Neither philosopher was aware how much he depended on the complications of an introspective mental science. In tracing the relation between Schopenhauer and Kant, it is instructive, as an introduction to the study of the foundations of the two systems, to determine the respective views of these philosophers on the subject of psychology.

A COMPARISON OF THE RESPECTIVE VIEWS OF KANT AND SCHOPENHAUER REGARDING PSYCHOLOGY.

Man's introspective analysis of self determines his metaphysics, hence a system of metaphysics can be constructed only on the basis of psychology. Primitive man, with the restriction of his powers by an external universe, discovers self as an object among other objects. Later in the mental history of mankind comes reflection on the dual nature of self as body and soul, this distinction arising from observance of the phenomenon of death. Finding that only the soul is animate, man places the forces of the universe at the disposal of many souls or only one, giving a polytheistic or theistic solution to the metaphysical problem of cosmology. With the gradual rise of self consciousness, man passes beyond a crude conception of the nature and origin of the cosmos. Discovering the principle of unity in self-consciousness, man projects it, turning popular dualism,—bodies and souls co-existent as reals,—to either a materialistic monism, which eliminates souls, or idealistic monism, eliminating bodies. The study of self is the clue to the mystery of reality, which is the end and aim of all philosophical systems.

"All true criticism of philosophical doctrine as of every other product of human mind, must begin with an historic estimate of the conditions antecedent and contemporary which helped to make it precisely what it was."¹ Hence it is necessary to examine into the nature of the pre-Kantian influence that overshadowed the psychological conceptions of Kant, and through him, Schopenhauer.

It was the fault of his age that Kant undervalued the service of psychology in solving his problems. Much of the subject-matter belonging properly to that discipline had been included in other departments of research.

In the investigations of Locke, psychology subserved the end of epistemology without having proper credit for its usurped material. This great English advocate of experience broke the ground which Kant tilled with so much labor for succeeding

¹ *Pater*, Plato and Platonism, p. 111.

generations to reap the benefit. The mental mechanism which Locke assured his world was in operation was imperfect. Perception is not passive. It does not wait for sensations, but goes in search of them. His distinction between primary and secondary qualities cannot be allowed, as perception is the only source of knowledge of objective reality. There is no reason why extension should belong to the object and color be supplied by the mind. This error also arises from overlooking the spontaneous activity of perception in gaining its material. The object with its qualities, extension, solidity, motion, sound, color, sweetness, is produced on the occasion of an excitation; not first one quality, then another, but all simultaneously.

Leibnitz thought that Locke had commenced an important inquiry, but he rightly considered that other problems should be solved before propounding a theory of knowledge. His own offer to eighteenth century thought was important. Leibnitz introduced monads, points, differing from the atoms of Democritus by having a spiritual essence and lacking extension. The Leibnitzian monadology influenced Kant's view of consciousness. Leibnitz advocated subjecting the content of clear perceptions, (intuitions), to logical analysis, failing however, to realize that logical clearness in the statement of the content of perception does not reveal the nature of the reality concerned.

Kant objects to the view of confusion in sensibility taken by Leibnitz and Christian Wolf, who embraced and systematized the conceptions of Leibnitz. "*Dass daher unsere ganze Sinnlichkeit nichts als die verworrene Vorstellung der Dinge sei, welche lediglich das enthalt, was ihnen an sich selbst zukommt.*"* He insists that we know the nature of things by our sensibility neither confusedly, nor at all. * If we drop our subjective condition, the object, as represented with its qualities bestowed on it by sensuous intuition, is nowhere to be found, and cannot possibly be found; because its form, as phenomenal appearance, is determined by those very subjective conditions."

It is necessary to place Berkeley in the Kantian genealogical table. He completely destroyed the objective existence of the body. Kant refuted his view that knowledge gained by the senses is illusory. Truth is inseparable from experience.

*Kant's *Sammtliche Werke* 111, p. 73.

The destructive methods of Hume's scepticism proved a new impetus to philosophical research. He overthrew the possibility of knowledge. Mathematics, the sciences, and metaphysics would disappear with knowledge destroyed. Kant went to work immediately to save mathematics and a scientific metaphysics, if that were indeed possible, but he threw away psychology as an endeavor of no consequence, since it could not be reduced to mathematical formulæ.

Kant did not reject psychology because the introspective method was the chief means of acquiring data, but because of the non-quantitative nature of the subject. Psychology could not become scientific. Here Kant misconceives the province of a science. It compiles facts, but does not explain them. It notes the behavior of phenomena, but does not inquire into their nature. A science describes its particular phenomena with their interrelations and laws of growth. Psychology ¹"describes and explains the phenomena of consciousness, as such," that is, dealing with the facts of consciousness it discovers existing relations and traces the development of the phenomena of mental life.

In selecting logic as a propædæutic to philosophy Kant was certain he found a science following "that secure method" which would bring it to a standstill when its goal was reached. Indeed, logic in the time of Kant was a perfected system," the vestibule of the sciences."

Logic is concerned with the laws of the understanding. It teaches *how to think*. It deals with the form of thought. Kant drives psychology from logic. Logic shall not look to psychology for its material, though it deals with thought, and thinking processes are the special concerns of psychology.

²"All the principal problems into which the attempt to explain psychic facts leads the investigator, themselves lead to the greater and profounder problems of philosophy. Psychology is then the special propædæutic to philosophy." But psychology is more than a mental gymnasium for the training of philosophical aspirants. The problems of philosophy take their rise in perception and self-consciousness. Metaphysics does not exist

1 Ladd, Psychology, Descriptive and Explanatory, p. 1.

2 Ladd, Psychology, Descriptive and Explanatory, p. 12.

except as a summary of the results and portents of the analysis of mental phenoma. A line cannot be closely drawn between the two endeavors whose aim is *reality*.

Kant had very little use for *Seelenlehre* as he understood it. It was dismissed from logic¹ without time to pack its belongings, and summarily expelled from metaphysics.² "*Also muss empirische Psychologie aus der Metaphysik gänzlich verbannt sein und ist schon durch die Idee derselben gänzlich ausgeschlossen.*"

Schopenhauer was alert to scientific tendencies. He incorporated physical facts into his system. He reduced the intellect to a mere function³ of the brain. Its manifestations were completely dependent on the activity of the brain and the supply of blood. Taking such a position, he tends to realistic materialism.

He approaches the individual very closely, but, in spite of the fact that he considers he has done more⁴ "for the knowledge of the inner man than is to be found in many systematic psychologies," he has failed to give a close analysis of the self-activity. His work consists in emphasizing the relation of the intellect to will. The intellect is derivative and secondary, a mere "tool" of the will.

Schopenhauer undoubtedly recognizes the import of psychology. His emphasis of the part played by "cerebral psychology" definitely connects him with certain modern movements. He does not, however, consciously build up his systems with the material of a science, which in his day, contemporary as it was with that of the great Herbart, was just beginning to put forth its claims to be recognized as the ground-work of all metaphysics. Schopenhauer failed to think through his problems to their true psychological basis.

¹ Kant, *Sammtliche Werke*, III, p. 83.

² Id. p. 558

³ Id. p. 242

⁴ Kant, *Sammtliche Werke*, III, p. 225.

KANT'S GREAT QUESTION, COMPARED WITH THE PROBLEM TO WHICH
SCHÖPENHAUER ADDRESSES HIMSELF; KNOWING A WORLD
OF CONCRETE REALITIES, WHERE IS THE TRANSI-
TION TO A WORLD OF INFINITE REALITIES.

From Descartes to Kant philosophy has been trying to build up a theory of reality. How shall we account for a transition from that which is given in experience to a hidden real?

Kant, noting the weakness of his predecessors in attempting to bridge the chasm without sufficiently surveying the ground on either side, refused to advance until he had examined the nature of *apriori* consciousness. He decided that the realm of reals was forever unreachable, locked up in the noumenon. Schopenhauer corrected the scepticism of Kant, in revealing the nature of the noumenon.

According to Locke¹ the mind contains ideas of things as they are in themselves, such ideas being conveyed by sensation and reflection. The perceptions of external objects are produced by sensation. The mind, noting its action in receiving sensations, gives rise to ideas about mental operations. These are all the ideas. The mind is wholly passive and can make no new ideas, save by repeating and combining these simple original ones. Ideas of relation arise from comparison, but are derived from sensation and reflection. There is no other source.

Hume admitted a relation not gained from experience. He was not able to explain that experience is itself impossible without the *capacity* for experience, but he saw that concepts derived from experience could not be used for knowledge exceeding the limits of all experience. The attempt to do this ended in illusion. He gave himself over to complete scepticism, denying that there was any knowledge except that of fact given in experience. Such knowledge could not be universal or necessary.

Here Kant introduces his problem: is there any knowledge which transcends experience? His *Kritik der reinen Vernunft* is an inquiry as to whether human reason contains knowledge a

¹ Cf. Abstract of Essay on Human Understanding. *King*, life and Letters of John Locke.

priori, that is, knowledge not based on experience. The general problem is how experience actually comes about.

The origin of knowledge, what it really means to know a thing, was first brought out by Locke. Hume examined into the origin of ideas of things as they are by themselves, with sceptical outcome. Kant took up the problem and worked out a theory of knowledge. He examined forms of knowledge in their relation to one another. The products of reason are given in terms of knowledge. What is knowledge? Where is it found? It is not found in the processes of thinking. It is not found in the concept. It is not found in sensuous presentation. In the union, (through the schema), of the category, or concept by which an object is thought, with the sensuous presentation, knowledge is produced.

Kant expresses his question in different forms. "My principal problem is and remains, what and how much may understanding and reason know without all experience?" There are two kinds of judgments, analytic, by which the subject is expanded or defined without the addition of new material, and synthetic, by which something new is added to the subject. All advance in the field of experience is made by synthetic judgments, but "how are synthetic judgments *a priori* possible?"

Kant had an especial tenderness for human interests. "*Alles Interesse meiner Vernunft, (das speculative sowohl, als das praktische,) vereinigt sich in folgenden drei Fragen:*

1. *Was kann ich wissen?*
2. *Was soll ich thun?*
3. *Was darf ich hoffen?"*

How he worked out his problem will be shown by the results of the psychological inquiry it will be necessary to promote in the course of this introduction, in order to give a proper historical setting to the object of our study, Arthur Schopenhauer, who considered himself the sole successor of Kant.

Kant changed the standpoint from the known object to the knowing subject. Thus the visible universe was conditioned upon the forms of the intellect, space, time, and the categories. Schopenhauer regarded this as an important discovery.²

1 Kant. Sämmtliche Werke, 111, p. 10.

2 Schopenhauer, Sämmtliche Werke 11, Bk. 1, p. 7, §3.

That which we see; that to which we ascribe qualities; is not the object, but only an appearance, a phenomenon. What is the unreachable thing-in-itself, the noumenon?

Knowledge and reality advance hand in hand, step by step. As knowledge grows the gap widens between the apparant and the real. Though the sun of knowledge shines upon the external world, there is still a feeling that there is more than the physical sciences can explain. To find this something is the problem. What is this that lies behind the object and self of our experience?

Schopenhauer sets himself the task of bridging the chasm between phenomena and the noumenon, not the Kantian dream¹ of a noumenon, for Schopenhauer considers that no reality exists beyond the appearance of the object, but noumenon as the inner, invisible principle of the self. He says² "we can never arrive at the real nature of things from without". Look within and find *will*. Will is the reality behind experience. Phenomenon and noumenon are two aspects of one reality, *will*

Schopenhauer states in the preface to his great work, *Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung*, that he has only a single thought to impart. This thought is presented in two ways, as will objectified, and as will the world-ground. His intention is to prove³ "this whole world is only object in relation to subject, perception of a perceiver, in a word, idea," and also that "the world is my will."

Kant shows that the phenomenal world is different from the real world. Is it possible then, to reach the real world? Kant says we must ever remain on the outside of things, but according to Schopenhauer,⁴ "we ourselves are the thing-in-itself". Therefore, there is a way to seize the "dark tower" from within.

1 Id. p. 5 § 1.

2 Id. p. 118 § 17.

3 *Schopenhauer*, *Sämmtliche Werke* 11, Bk. 1, p. 3. 4. §1.

4 Id. 111, Bk. 11 ch 18, p. 221.

THE EXTENT OF KANT'S INFLUENCE UPON SCHOPENHAUER IN THE
FORMATION OF HIS CONCEPTION OF PSYCHOLOGY.

Schopenhauer states that while writing his thesis for the doctorate "*Ueber die vierfache Wurzel des Satzes vom zureichenden Grunde*," the Kantian philosophy had an "excessive influence" over him. This essay was written in his twenty-fifth year and has a definite connection with Kantian philosophy.

Only a fourth of his work as summed-up in *Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung* is derived from Kant. The first book is under Kantian influence, but the second book is not. The third book refers to Plato, while the fourth book is against Kant. The appendix in which he criticises Kantian philosophy is "polemical against" Kant.

Schopenhauer did not accept Kant's doctrine of the twelve categories. Causality is the only function of the understanding¹.

What a man knows he will express clearly in speech or writing. The language of Kant's deduction of the categories is very obscure, as compared to the simple, beautiful, comprehensible elucidation of *die Transscendentale Ästhetik*. The ponderous machinery with its twelve wheels was unable to grind out information about the external world. Kant always used the category of causality to illustrate the working of his "symmetrical, logical system." "The law of causality is indeed the real form of the understanding, but it is also its only form, and the remaining eleven categories are merely blind windows."²

"Schopenhauer did not accept Kant's deduction of the thing in itself. He thought Kant should have drawn the inference that there could be "no object without a subject" Kant took a wrong view of the law of causality and attempted to find a cause for sensation in the object-in-itself. Perception is a process within us. Hence we arrive at the nature of the noumenon through immediate awareness.

Kant's definition of reason was very unsatisfactory to Schopenhauer. At the proper place it will be shown in detail

¹ Schopenhauer, *Sämmtliche Werke*, 11, Bk. 1. p. 14, § 4.

² *Id.* p. 529.

why he characterized Kant's conception of the nature of reason as "confused and falsified."

Kant admits a transcendental freedom, but Schopenhauer denies that this speculative idea is the origin of the conception of freedom. He says that this arises directly in consciousness. Schopenhauer gives no place to freedom. He does not concede it to the world of reason. Here every thing comes about in a mechanical way. There is no freedom, even of the thing-in-itself.

With Schopenhauer's denial of the freedom of the will comes the rejection of Kant's *Kritik der praktischen Vernunft*. Kant made a place here for his Categorical Imperative. Every being acts under the idea of freedom.

Having examined a few of the points where Kantian doctrine spurred opposition in the mind of Schopenhauer, it is now possible to proceed to an inquiry as to what he incorporated in his system, keeping in mind the psychological view-point.

"Kant's größtes Verdienst ist die Unterscheidung der Erscheinung vom Dinge an sich", but Schopenhauer went beyond this and determined the nature of the thing-in-itself to be will, though the idea was born in Kantian study and reflection. Schopenhauer adopted the whole general idea of the *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*. He considered the separation of *a priori* knowledge, or such information as is not drawn from experience, but is imparted from within, and *a posteriori*, or empirical knowledge, an important step. The whole of the transcendental æsthetic proved acceptable. He upheld the truth of the subjectivity of time, space, and causality.

Kant based his moral law on the will, but he did not think through to the conclusion reached by Schopenhauer that will is the thing-in-itself, the reality.

Schopenhauer accepted *Die Postulate des empirischen Denkens überhaupt*; also Kant's doctrine of necessity, though he criticized it as involving contradictions.

CHAPTER II.

AN INVESTIGATION OF SCHOPENHAUER'S CLAIM TO HAVE EXTENDED
THE KANTIAN SYSTEM.

Schopenhauer valued psychology more than Kant, but he did not reach a conception of it as a basal science. His problems grew out of what he conceived to be the unfinished work of Kant, especially the main question concerning the transition from the experiential to the real. The Kantian source of his problems is shown where he voluntarily reveals the fact that he is under the spell of Kant or tries to emerge from the shadow of his great master into the clear light of another day.

With Kant the nature of the object was forever hidden,

"There was the Door to which I found

no Key;

There was the Veil through I

might not see."

Schopenhauer prided himself on the fact that he had found the key. On the objective side, we have a triple veil, space, time and causality, but on the subjective side, only the time-form separates us from the treasure, and this veil may be destroyed.

He regarded himself as standing next to Kant. ¹"At any rate, I cannot see that between Kant and myself anything has been done in philosophy; therefore I regard myself as his immediate successor."

It is necessary to make a detailed psychological investigation at points in the Kantian system, where Schopenhauer claims to have made extensions.

§ 1.

THE INQUIRY CONDUCTED FROM A PSYCHOLOGICAL STANDPOINT.

Schopenhauer considers that Kant's system leads into his in the solution of the third antinomy, where Kant makes the spontaneous activity of the will a factor in the origination "of successive things or states."

Touching upon the idea of freedom he is obliged to introduce the thing-in-itself to give phenomena a cause beyond ex-

¹ Schopenhauer, *Sämmtliche Werke*, II, p. 493.

perience. Here he is inconsistent, because he has previously insisted that the categories and causality were limited to the sense world.

¹"The thing-in-itself I have neither introduced surreptitiously nor inferred according to laws which exclude it, because they really belong to its phenomenal appearance; nor, in general, have I arrived at it by roundabout ways. On the contrary, I have shown it directly, there where it lies immediately in the will, which reveals itself to every one directly as the thing-in-itself of his own phenomal being,"

Schopenhauer believed that the idea of will as the thing-in-itself was latent in Kant's mind. "*Ich nehme daher wirklich an, obwohl es nicht zu beweisen ist, dass Kant, so oft er vom Ding an sich redete, in der dunkelsten Tiefe seines Geistes, immer schon den Willen undeutlich dachte.*" He, however, was the first philosopher to raise the assumption to the dignity of a philosophical doctrine.

The reasoning process of Kant gave offense to Schopenhauer, who sought to eliminate the contradictions in terms and functions, and to free the system from its complexity and obscurity.

Kant found that in order to know things at all, there must be mental capacity for acquiring such knowledge. It is given in the forms and laws of the intellect. The transcendental æsthetic opens the door to sense-experience. The object is received in the forms of space and time, but it must be *thought* to be an object of knowledge.

Understanding apprehends relations. It unites the parts given in perception into a whole by its power of judging. ²"Without sensibility objects would not be given to us, without understanding they would not be thought by us." By means of concepts, understanding forms judgments. Judgment brings the concept to the immediate impression of the object. The faculty of imagination cannot be disregarded. It holds the manifold in its grasp. It is the link between Sense and Understanding.

The manifold, or "that which is given" is intuited through the senses. The separate parts of this experience data are set

¹ Schopenhauer, *Smmtliche Werke*, II, p. 597.

² *Kant, Sammtliche Werke*, III, p. 82.

together by the faculty of imagination, and recognized under the concepts of the understanding by discriminating consciousness, the "synthetic unity of apperception." Certain pure and indispensable concepts are found *a priori* in the understanding. These are the categories.

¹"All our knowledge begins with the senses, proceeds thence to the understanding, and ends with reason." The understanding produces unity among phenomena according to rules. Reason produces unity among the rules of the understanding according to principles.² The concepts of reason are called by Kant, "transcendental ideas." The work of the reason is to direct the rules of the understanding towards a "certain unity" of which the understanding itself knows nothing.³

The above is a brief outline of Kant's view of the transformation of the sense-material into the concept of the understanding, and, by application of the syllogisms to this pure concept or category, into the idea of the reason.

To begin with perception, Schopenhauer considers that Kant did not rightly distinguish between perception and abstract knowledge. This Kant did do, but the line is not drawn distinctly between perception and sensibility. He nowhere distinctly faces the problem of perception.

⁴"Our knowledge," says Kant, "springs from two fundamental sources of our own soul; the first—receives representations (receptivity of impressions), the second is the power of knowing an object by these representations, (spontaneity of concepts). By the first an object is given us, by the second the object is thought" Here Schopenhauer takes exception. Such an impression would be "already an idea, and indeed an object," while it is merely a sensation which changes into an idea by the forms of perception and the function of the understanding.

There is undoubtedly great confusion in Kant's definitions of perception, understanding and reasoning. Understanding repeatedly invades the territory of perception, while it also interchanges functions with reasoning.

¹ *Kant Sammtliche Werke*, III, p. 247.

² *Id.* p. 249.

³ *Id.* p. 264.

⁴ *Kant, Sammtliche Werke*, p. 81.

Schopenhauer shows the glaring contradictions in his *Kritik der Kantischen Philosophie*. At first it would seem "that this perceptible world would exist for us if we had no understanding at all."¹ This view is overthrown when we find understanding the "lawgiver of nature"²

Understanding is a "non-sensuous faculty of knowledge." It is not a faculty of intuition such as perception. The knowledge of the understanding is gained "by means of concepts" and the use it makes of these is to form judgment "A judgment is therefore a mediate knowledge of an object or an idea of an idea." Understanding is the faculty of thinking and thinking is knowledge by means of concepts.³ The categories of the understanding "are not conditions under which objects can be given in intuition."⁴ Perception does not require the introduction of thought.⁵

Instead of the separation of perception and understanding being strictly maintained, we find the pure concepts (categories) of the understanding referring *a priori* to objects.⁶ The categories "supply the objective ground of the possibility of experience."⁷ Understanding is "itself the source of the laws of nature."⁸ Schopenhauer further objects to that statement⁹ "that without thought, that is without abstract conceptions, there is no knowledge, and in general, is nothing but a mere affection of sensibility, mere sensation! Nay more, that perception without conception is absolutely void; but conception without perception is always something".¹⁰

It is not necessary to continue to set forth these contradictions. They also obscure the definitions of understanding and reason. Understanding is the faculty of judging. Reason appropriates this function.

1 Schopenhauer, *Sammtliche Werke*, II p. 421

2 Kant, *Sammtliche Werke*, III, p. 583.

3 *Id.* p. 92-93.

4 *Id.* p. 109.

5 *Id.* p. 110.

6 Kant, *Sammtliche Werke*, III, p. 100.

7 *Id.* p. 112.

8 *Id.* p. 583.

9 *Id.* p. 220-221.

10 Schopenhauer, *Sammtliche Werke*, II. p. 562.

Out of this mass of contradictions, comes the statement of Schopenhauer, which is an extension, in as much as it follows the law of development from the complex and obscure to the simple and clear.

Simple sensation, the psychical pre-condition of conception, is the corner-stone for the foundations of a temple of intelligence. Sensations give rise to *ideas of perception* ¹ "These comprehend the whole visible world or the sum total of experience, with the conditions of its possibility." Perception is the source of all evidence by which we have to judge of externality. Here the construction of the objective world takes place.

The field of perception includes the body as an object among other objects,—and those other objects. The psychology of perception investigates the mechanism by which these objectified wills (objects) become the data of knowledge. The forms of receiving information are time, space and causality. The content of time and space is everything that proceeds from cause and motion. Only so far as these forms are occupied by matter do they become perceptible and cognizable. Matter is therefore the objectivity of time and space, and is as unreal as the forms that contain it. Time represents what is internal; space what is external; and causality, or force, matter.

Just as ideas are the field of perception, so concepts constitute the field of reason. The understanding has as its one special function the relation of cause to effect, while perception adjusts spatial and temporal relations. Understanding has no power of generalization, but it can discern the relation as cause to effect, while reason takes the idea given it by perception and refers it to its class or general notion, where it becomes a concept.

Concepts stand in a necessary relation to perception as an idea of an idea. They form a distinct class of ideas which have their existence only in human minds. These are entirely different from the ideas which form the material of perception. They can only be thought, and cannot be verified directly by experience as can perception-ideas.

¹ Id. II, bk. I, §3, p. 7.

SCHOPENHAUER'S DETERMINATION OF THE NATURE OF THE UNKNOWN
QUANTITY IN WHICH THE KANTIAN SYSTEM ENDED.

Kant used mathematics as a guide for his system, but Schopenhauer had no model. He felt the need of a unitary explanation of nature, and posited will to solve the riddle of the universe.

We have the object given under subjective forms. Having the object we proceed to derive the subject. In every act of knowledge we have both subject and object, a knower and the thing known. There is something more than is given in the act of knowing. This is the unknown quantity in which the Kantian system ended. What is that which we feel (believe in) yet cannot bring under the forms of knowledge? The object is that which is manifested. It is the "that which" we seek to grasp. We seize upon the reality of the self as willing. By analogy we know the inner nature of the manifested to be will.

To reach reality is the goal of metaphysics. Knowledge involves reference to something not given in knowledge. Mr. Spencer expresses this left-over feeling in the following passage. "Intellectual action being a perpetual forming of relations between the states from moment to moment passing, and being incapable of arresting itself, tends irresistibly to form them when it reaches the limit of intelligence. The inevitable effect of our mental constitution is that on reaching the limit thought rushes out to form a new relation and cannot form it. A conflict hence arises between an effort to pass into the Unknowable and an inability to pass—a conflict which involves the inconsistency of feeling obliged to think something and being unable to think it"¹

With this sceptical view Kant accords. "All our representations are no doubt referred by the understanding to some sort of object, and as phenomena are nothing but representations, the understanding refers them to a something, as the object of our sensuous intuition, this something being however the transcendental object only. This means a something equal to x , of

¹ *Spencer*, First Principles, 126 c.

which we do not, nay with the present constitution of our understanding, cannot know anything."¹

Plato recognizes the reaching-forth of the intelligence and offers his *ideas* as the field of truth for which the *nous* longs.²

Kant found metaphysics impossible because the world of reason is bounded by a finite world, the nature of which it cannot explore. Schopenhauer comes to the rescue and claims that the inner and outer experience can be brought together in one reality, which he determines as will. He believed that he had overcome Kant's scepticism and made metaphysics a possible science.

What does Schopenhauer mean by will? The reality of the world is understood in terms of will. The reality of the world is only will. Scientists juggle entities, Matter, Mass, Force, Energy, Ether. What are these in and for themselves? Schopenhauer answers *will*. Will is the ground-principle, the indefinable, inner essence of all things. What am I?—will, struggling, desiring will, conscious and unconscious. What is the watch on the table apart from its roundness, its hardness, its yellow color! What is it in-itself?—will objectified. Here Schopenhauer extends the Kantian System. It ended in a blind alley, but Schopenhauer broke down all barriers and made a road for future philosophy.

§3.

A PERSONAL VIEW OF SCHOPENHAUER'S CLAIM TO BE A SUCCESSOR OF KANT.

Schopenhauer says he is the only and true successor of Kant. For Kant *things-in-themselves* existed, were left over. Schopenhauer denies things-in-themselves. There is nothing outside of perceptibility. There can be no object without a subject. He presupposed the non-agreement of the representation with the real. Kant considered the elements of knowledge as object and subject. With Schopenhauer everything existing for cognition is an object only with reference to a knowing subject. The existence of all objects consists in their relation to each other under the principle of sufficient reason. For Kant there was an objective world,—external. For Schopenhauer there was internal essence,—will.

¹ Kant *Sammtliche Werke*, III, p. 217.

² Plato, *Phædrus*, 245

Schopenhauer extended the bounds of knowledge. This historically was an extension of the Kantian system. He turned his attention to the thing-in-itself, which his predecessors had neglected. He banished the Kantian noumenon, the left-over object.

In order to be the true successor of Kant, Schopenhauer must reduce the Kantian system to unity, which can be accomplished only by abolishing the doctrine of the spontaneous activity of consciousness, making the subject derivative and dependent. By making intellect proceed from the will, Schopenhauer thought he had overcome the dualism in Kant, springing from the co-existence of two reals subject and object. But Schopenhauer did not free his system from dualism. He established two systems, the intellectual based on active self-consciousness, and voluntaristic, based on unconsciousness. The will in activity is not the will in the world. My act cannot be identified with what appears in nature. Being is willing, but the will which Schopenhauer posits as the reality, the noumenon, is the impossible pure being an abstraction of no value. The relation of will as essence to phenomena is not that of cause to effect. If it does nothing, causes nothing, it is nothing. This will finds its psychological basis in unconsciousness, or rather in non-existence.

Returning to the connection between ideas and the knowing self, the relation between being and consciousness can only be explained by the fact that consciousness "Looks at its own action" and creates both the real and ideal series of experiences. Here we have conscious activity as a world ground.

Schopenhauer involved himself in contradictions in trying to reconcile two systems, one based on consciousness and the other on unconsciousness.

The Kantian cloak did not fall upon the shoulders of Schopenhauer. He found a warrant in Kant for basing his system on spontaneous activity of consciousness, but his own agnostical interpretation of self-consciousness, the impossibility of knowing the subject, prevented him from inaugurating what might have proved a consistent system. He surrendered consciousness in the interest of reality.

Only historically is Schopenhauer the successor of Kant.

CHAPTER III.

THE FEATURES OF THE KANTIAN AND SCHOPENHAUER SYSTEMS
WHICH MAKE DEVELOPMENT INTO A SCHOOL OF
THOUGHT POSSIBLE.

Having fully examined the relationship of Schopenhauer to Kant, we can proceed to a discovery of those features which opened up a possible development into a school of thought.

Schopenhauer in erecting his system of metaphysics had a consciousness of the relation between forms of being and forms of knowing. An inquiry as to the what-ness of the thing-in-itself is a metaphysical question.

Kant wrote the *Kritik der reinen Vernunft* in five months, but he took years to plan it. This has been the most influential of his works. "For since he did not set up a completely new system to which his disciples could have adhered for a period, all indeed observed that something very great had happened, but yet no one rightly knew what."¹

The first edition had more influence than the second, owing to the corrections and elucidations in the latter which spoil the harmony of his work. Kant originated new problems. Historically all problems centralize in him. He left room for the development of a system in the unsolved problems. The left-over thoughts were so many live impulses.

The first requisite of a school of thought is a following of people willing to accept the same teachings. There is a more or less passive discipleship during the life of the founder. When the work of the master is finished, the disciples take it up and sow the seeds of his doctrine. The future life of the school depends upon its tendency to arouse criticism resulting in opposition or partisanship.

A true philosophical system carries the results of all the investigations of phenomena and seeks to discover an active world ground which will contain Self and Body, Essence and Object, as co-existent reals, mutually interactive, interrelated, and interinterpretive; independent yet significant of a unity in the life from which they draw their sustenance. Schopenhauer says "the disciplining of the world must completely prove itself from itself. It must throw equal light upon all phenomena of the

¹ Schopenhauer. *Werke* II, p. 504,

world, and also bring the most heterogeneous into agreement, so that the contradictions between those which are most in contrast may be abolished."¹

The metaphysics of Kant did not survey all points for the finding of a world-ground. He left out the *essence* as impossible of discovery, yet he furnished the possibility of a supporting basis in his advocacy of the spontaneity of consciousness.

Schopenhauer, on the other hand, sought a world-ground, but made it a logical abstraction, a causeless entity, a non-existent. However his contradictions showed that with clearer insight he would have built up an imperishable system on active will, allied with, and inseparable from consciousness, as a world-ground.

The aim of philosophy is epistemological in as much as the result of its metaphysical endeavor can only be interpreted by cognitive effort. ²"Its only goal is wisdom, and the path to it science, the only path which if once opened is never grown over again, and can never mislead." Schopenhauer's conception is broader than Kant's. ³"Philosophy can never do more than interpret and explain what is given. It can only bring to disabstract knowledge of the reason the nature of the world which in the concrete, that is, as feeling, expresses itself comprehensibly to every one, This, however, it does in every possible reference and from every point of view."

Have we any right to undertake the construction of a metaphysical system? The origin and destiny of man has been the ground-work of such an inquiry through the ages. When man begins to differentiate himself from his environment, he commences the construction of a metaphysical system. "The lower a man stands in an intellectual regard, the less of a problem is existence itself for him; everything how it is, and that it is, appears to him rather a matter of course."⁴ Still he cannot avoid such reflection however crude. Hence it is right to erect a system to give as far as possible a correct and clear direction to man's necessary thought. No one can question the fact that

¹ *Schopenhauer, Werke*, III Bk. 1, ch. XVII, p. 205.

² *Kant, Werke*, III, p. 500.

³ *Schopenhauer, Werke* II, Bk. IV. 53, p. 320.

⁴ *Id. Werke*, III, Bk. I, ch. XVII, p. 176.

man is at liberty to use his reflective powers, yet in so doing he raises metaphysical problems.¹

Schopenhauer starts neither from the Object as all the pre-Kantians, nor from the Subject, as Kant, but from the "idea, which contains and presupposes them both." He starts correctly in opening his treatise on the "World as Will and Idea" with an examination of the idea. Problems of knowledge precede problems of reality. Every system must start from the most presuppositionless statement. "*Cogito, ergo sum*" is not the simplest, statement nor is Schopenhauer's that things are ideas. Immediate awareness is the starting-point, *scio*.

§ 1.

A COMPARISON OF THE TWO SYSTEMS WITH REFERENCE TO THEIR PSYCHOLOGICAL BACKGROUND.

Kant's was a psychological age, and it was Kant who exerted the greatest influence on this science of any one of his time. He examined into its matter, and threw it aside, but though he halted its progress, its advocates were not disheartened.

Taking Kant first, we find knowledge gathered up in this wise. The manifold is intuited in Sensibility, grasped in the act of the imagination², held before discriminating consciousness, apprehended by the relating power of the understanding, brought under concepts and clarified by reason.

The understanding is the judging faculty. It relates the parts in perception and constructs the object of knowledge.³ "The Understanding cannot see, the Senses cannot think. By their union only, can knowledge be produced." The understanding is non-sensuous. It is the cradle of concepts. By means of the concepts it forms judgments. The categories are mere empty forms of the understanding, such as space and time are forms of the faculty of sense. The work of the understanding is for the experiential, yet it cannot define its own boundary. It limits "the sensibility, without enlarging there by its own field."⁴

¹ Ladd, *Theory of Reality*, ch. 1, p. 1.

² Kant *Sammtliche Werke*, III, p. 99

³ Id. p. 82.

⁴ Id. p. 241.

Knowledge begins with the sensibility, is ordered by the understanding and docketed by reason.¹ Understanding is the faculty of rules, reason, the faculty of principles ²“*So bezieht sich demnach die Vernunft nur auf den Verstandesgebrauch, und zwar nicht so fern dieser den Grund möglicher Erfahrung enthält, (denn die absolute Totalität der Bedingungen ist kein in einer Erfahrung brauchbarer Begriff weil keine Erfahrung unbedingt ist,) sondern um ihm die Richtung auf eine gewisse Einheit vorzuschreiben, von der der Verstand keinen Begriff hat und die darauf hinaus geht, alle Verstandeshandlungen in Ausübung eines jeden Gegenstandes in ein absolutes Ganze zusammen zu fassen.*”

The categories were for everything, but the three kinds of syllogisms were only for the three ideas. The idea of the soul originated in the categorical syllogism. Out of the hypothetical syllogism came the idea of the world, and out of the disjunctive syllogism came the idea of God.

Die Welt ist meine Vorstellung.” So commences Schopenhauer. His method of procedure assumes neither object nor subject as a starting-point, but the idea which is a combination of both, and is the “first fact of consciousness.”

There are two kinds of ideas, those of perception and those of the understanding. The perception-idea is the object. Its substance is matter which is produced by the union of space and time through causation. The law of causality determines what “occupies this time and this space.”

The first requirement is sensation. Until effects are referred to their causes there is no perception. ³“But as with the rising of the sun the visible world appears, so at one stroke, the understanding, by means of its one simple function, changes the dull meaningless sensation into perception.” The arm of the understanding, sweeping from effect to cause, brings the object to perception extended in space and enduring in time.

Schopenhauer was opposed to a thorough-going sensationism. He showed the intellectual nature of perception, proving it not a result of a collection of sensations. The immediate act of the understanding passing from effect to cause converts the sensation into the perception-idea with so much rapidity that the

¹ Schopenhauer, *Sammtliche Werke*, II, p. 575.

² *Kant, Werke* p. 264.

³ *Schopenhauer Werke* II, Bk. I § 4 p. 14.

object and its image are not distinguishable in consciousness. Concepts must return to perceptions. Schopenhauer emphasizes the importance of gaining perceptions rather than conceptions formed by someone else. "Real knowledge on the contrary, that is, immediate knowledge, is perception alone, new fresh perception itself"¹ Perceptions are the treasures of the storehouses of knowledge. He who juggles the empty concepts conned from the works of another cannot hope to vie with the man who portrays fresh from the clearly printed pages of his own edition of the book of nature. Perceptions rather than conceptions are the recognized currency.

The understanding has only one function, the knowledge of cause and effect. The object is transformed into the perception idea, and is abstracted into the concept subserving the use of reason.

Concepts are thought not perceived. Their importance is recognized in language, where completely generalized knowledge is communicated as rapidly as possible. ²"The meaning of speech is, as a rule, immediately grasped, accurately and distinctly taken in, without the imagination being brought into play. It is reason which speaks to reason, keeping within its own province. It communicates and receives abstract conceptions, ideas that can be presented in perceptions, which are framed once for all, and are relatively few in number, but which yet encompass, contain and represent all the innumerable objects of the actual world."

Reflection images the object of perception. "Thus concepts may quite properly be called ideas of ideas." The perception-idea furnishes the ground of knowledge for the abstract idea. One concept may include several ideas. Because of the generality of its nature many things can be thought under one concept. Two concepts may coincide; one may include the other; or two may lie in a third without filling it. Combinations of concept spheres constitute judgment. By means of two concepts a judgment can be formed which, while it contains something new from each of the known concepts, appear wholly new because brought distinctly to consciousness for the first time.

¹ *Schopenhauer Werke*, III p. 79.

² *Schopenhauer Werke*. II, p. 47.

The overlapping spheres give possibilities of trains of syllogisms.

The capacity for abstract ideas is the reason. It is this one power that distinguishes the life of man from that of the brute.

§2.

THE MENTAL PROCESSES BY WHICH WE CAN REACH REALITY.

Plato considered that reality was gained by thinking.¹ He secured it through abstract concepts. Hegel reached it by reason. Schopenhauer seized it.

Reality is more than a mere process. It cannot be identified with consciousness, because there is more in such a content than we can account for. It is not in the unknowable essence of things-in-themselves. This unknown reality is the ground of all we know. I know myself as will, and by that knowledge, all things as will.

Modern philosophy is attempting to construct a metaphysical theory of reality. How do we reach reality? What is it when obtained?

Schopenhauer's will could not be reached by reason. His world-ground was irrational. Will is known immediately in self-consciousness. The world knows itself through its own cognition. Schopenhauer says abstract the subject and you have reality. He obtains it in a dogmatic and intuitional way.

The problem of reality is so great that men cannot solve it alone. They form themselves into "schools," or some specialize and leave to others the task of combining the results. Schopenhauer appeared on the scene with a new view of the problem. He broke away from the old method of speculation according to a type and immediately derived truth. The intellect finds truth by surveying its forms in representation. The world of reality is only a world of phenomena. Reality can be stated in terms of consciousness.

The process of knowledge is rational. We cannot know a thing that is irrational. Hence we cannot know Schopenhauer's irrational will, and that path to reality is closed. We can accept only an explanation of a rational world-ground.

How shall we bring together the world of reality and the world of phenomena, brain and mind? For the solution of the

¹ *Plato, Phaedo* p. 76.

riddle, they must reduce to unity. Schopenhauer puts himself and his reality, pure subject, the correlate of the Idea, in its Platonic sense, and pure will, outside the principle of sufficient reason.

There is and there must be recognized in a philosophical system a total diversity between appearance and reality. For the man who never rises above the "senseplane," that which he sees and experiences is real. The thinking mind perceives that such a view leads to illusion and deception. "Things are not always what they seem."

The world of thought has only to do with appearances. The object is immediately imaged in perception, and it is with these images we deal without further reference to the the cause of the sensation.

In seeking the nature of things we first stumble upon the qualities. A little reflection soon convinces that these qualities are ascribed to the thing and therefore, do not reveal its nature. "This which we call the nature of things has been variously denominated as the essence, the what, or the whatness of things; and all of these terms refer not to the external properties of things, but to some inner principle, whereby things are what they are."¹

The fact remains that something acts in definite relation to something else or some other things. In its causal activity lies its reality. What it is that acts is a problem for metaphysics. Schopenhauer answered *will* for will is the ground of all activity.

How can self be identified with the world of things? That relations exist among selves and among things is established in knowledge processes, but it is necessary to show the relation between selves and things. If the relation is only a thought one, the world of things cannot be included. To sacrifice its *independence* of thought, would be to sacrifice its reality. The self constructs its own system of relations by thinking processes. It infers that other real beings construct a similar self-centered system with which it may come in contact in relations that are regarded as external, as opposed to those internal relations which are closed to its own being. Similarly, self infers that things have a self-centered system of relation. To be real a thing

¹ Bowne, Metaphysics ch. II, p. 29.

must independently construct its own system. If things are to be wholly included in the self-system, reality disappears

Self is only states of consciousness. We know ourselves as willing. This gives us a key to the whole universe. All forms of organic and inorganic nature are endowed with an inner life analogous to that which we experience. The psychical and physical processes are not in interaction, but there is complete concomitance.

Schopenhauer pronounces on the reality of the world, but limits us to the world. Hence his doctrine is one of immanency, and not of transcendency.

We do not get to reality by abstracting psychological qualities. Reality must be understood in terms of psychological conditions. Schopenhauer employs *will* and *idea* to solve the problem.

There is no means of dealing with reality save through our conceptions of it. This much is true; the world as reality must be explained in terms of self-activity. In consciousness we hold in solution all that there is of reality for us as human beings.

§3.

THE BASIS OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF A SCHOOL OF THOUGHT, WITH AN INQUIRY AS TO WHY THE KANTIAN SYSTEM IS FRUIT- FUL, AND WHEREIN LIES THE RICHNESS OF THE SCHOPENHAUER SYSTEM.

With all his love for logical symmetry Kant was not able to sufficiently divorce form and content to carry out his plan for a philosophical system with logical consistency.

Kant's task was too great. The stream of thought rose too rapidly, Kant in order to save the precious thought-flow and carry it to nourish the barren soil of truth, began to make irrigating canals, as the Mexicans dig *acequias* to lead off the water of the brown, sluggish Rio Grande. The stream filled too fast and Kant's channels were inadequate for the purpose. He could not avert the disaster of a flood, and the thoughts collected in pools or ran off in poorly constructed channels. After all it was Kant's stream of thought, however inadequate may have been his method of conveying it, and even the little pools have nourished great systems, as those of Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, Herbart, Schleiermacher, and Schopenhauer.

"Kant indeed, holds the key to all modern thought in Germany; his system, to adopt one of his own technicalities, is the necessary *propædæutic*, the indispensable preliminary information and discipline, for the acquisition of the later philosophy of Germany, and even for a full understanding of the tendencies of thought in the philosophical schools throughout the world."¹

Schopenhauer was long neglected, but finally it was discovered that his system contained some startling truths and many new points. The contradictions and inconsistencies in his system prevented the wide-spread development of his doctrines, but his work has an influence.

Schopenhauer overestimated the value of pessimism. Metaphysics deals with forms of being, pessimism, with values of one's existence in terms of qualities. We have no right to ascribe the quality good or bad to the world until we have established its reality. Without reality there can be no metaphysics. Schopenhauer considered that he had established the reality of the world as unconscious will. therefore, he had a right to say this will in its manifestations is bad; nothing could be worse; for the will-to-live entails suffering until relief comes in annihilation, or rather return to the unconscious state of the world-ground. Schopenhauer's estimate of man's life agrees with the poet's version.

"His speech is a burning fire;
 With his lips he travaileth;
 In his heart is a blind desire,
 In his eyes foreknowledge of death.
 He weaves, and is clothed with derision;
 Sows and he shall not reap;
 His life is a watch or a vision
 Between a sleep and a sleep."

The starting-point for the philosophical basis of the world must be in some form of consciousness. Idea is the starting-point of Schopenhauer. The idea which arises in perception is under the principle of sufficient reason. The real being of the world, however, does not come under this principle. It becomes known only through experience, through forms of representations, yet it is immediately seized upon in self consciousness.

¹ Bowen, Modern Philosophy, p. 159.

Schopenhauer's method of reflection was synthetic while Kant's was analytic. He tries to introduce empirical induction.

He claims to have developed philosophy from Plato to Kant. He considers that his work is the expression of one idea. He has wrested the secret of ever-struggling, manifesting will from nature, and attempts to interpret every phenomenon in terms of will.

Kant's distinct claim to philosophical consideration was in his recognition of the spontaneity of consciousness and his change of standpoint from the object to the subject or Self.

The particular tenet to which Schopenhauer's place in philosophy is due is the discovery of the analogy between selves and things, inasmuch as they are both self-centered willing systems. He placed the reality of nature in action rather than in being, in untiring ceaseless will. Know thyself, and you possess the key to nature. He introduced a new type of thought applied to a different class of facts. His method of induction as a relief from the deductions from speculative principles did much to effect a transition from Kantian idealism to the present-day realism. The development of a school of thought depends rather upon the methods of philosophizing than upon a particular tenet.

Impossibility of knowing the subject is agnosticism. We have the agnostic Kant in his handling of the problems of noumenon. The left-over, extra-mentality, the thing-in-itself could not be discovered, therefore, the self in and for itself could never be known.

Schopenhauer's interpretation of self-consciousness was also agnostical. A purely agnostical system could not be developed, but the inconsistencies in the Kantian and Schopenhauer systems make possible their development. The real value of these philosophers does not lie in the way they handle the noumenon.

Our past philosophers are judged by what they accomplished in their own times in turning popular thought from the mysticisms, absurdities and falsities of their predecessors to a clearer view in the light of progression; and by their influence on succeeding generations.

"There is no single philosopher of any note, even among those who are decidedly opposed to Kant, who has not acknowledged his pre-eminence among modern philosophers. The great

systems of Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, Herbart, and Schopenhauer branched off from Kant, and now, after a century has passed away, people begin to see that those systems were indeed mighty branches, but that the leading shoot of philosophy was and still is—Kant."¹

Schopenhauer had the gift of the poet and philosopher, intuition. The richness of his system was in the number of correct ideas sparkling in beds of contradictions. When these are mined out, we have a new and original philosophy that furnishes a clue to reality in the examination of our *willing* selves. In Self we find the nature of things, and in things the nature of the Self.

Although for years Schopenhauer's works suffered the greatest neglect, they have been rescued from oblivion, and exert a distinct influence on the thought of the present day. He influenced Browning and Wagner.

There is no doubt that his system contains truths, but as a *system* it cannot be harmoniously developed on account of the mutually-destroying contradictions. The gems of truth can be reset in another system, where they will shine in abundance and purity.

¹ Muller, Preface to Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, (tr.)

Ich erkenne meinen Willen nicht im Ganzen, nicht als Einheit, nicht vollkommen seinem Wesen nach, sondern ich erkenne ihn allein in seinen einzelnen Akten, also in der Zeit, welche die Form der Erscheinung meines Leibes, wie jedes Objectes ist: daher ist der Leib Bedingung der Erkenntniss meines Willens. Diesen Willen ohne meinen Leib kann ich demnach eigentlich nicht vorstellen.

—Schopenhauer, (Vol. 2, Bk. §18, p. 121.)

PART I.

BEGINNINGS OF THE WORLD AS WILL AND IDEA.

CHAPTER I.

SCHOPENHAUER'S IMPERSONAL WORLD GROUND AND ITS PSYCHOLOGICAL BASIS.

"What is this world of perception besides being my idea? Is that of which I am conscious only as idea, exactly like my own body, of which I am doubly conscious, in one aspect as *idea*, in another aspect as *will*?"¹ The world of perception is through and through will.

Will is only blind force in nature. In the lowest form of animal life it is impulse without the guiding ideas; but in the higher form of brute creation it develops intellect out of feeling. First comes feeling, then sensation, as containing the objective element, and finally perception, the basis of all knowledge. Will is primary and irrational, the world-ground. Intelligence is secondary, but through it will separates itself from feeling and becomes a rational factor, governing itself by ideas instead of being controlled by impulsive emotions.

Schopenhauer gives us the reality of the world in *action*. Only in activity can the will manifest itself as idea, and, in the activity of self-consciousness, the idea becomes a form of knowledge.

The knowledge of our body is given in a dual sense. We know it as both will and idea. Other bodies are known only as idea, but we attribute to them the inner principle, will, which we have discovered in ourselves. The nature of things is will. In the higher forms of animal life, the will is determined by ideas. In organic life will is moved by stimulation. In organic life it is a mechanical process.

"*Gnothi seauton*." If we did not know ourselves as will we could not get inside things for a comprehension of nature. The man who travels over the world in a portfolio of photographs, and the man who actually makes a circuit of the globe, have two different impressions that we may classify as "faint"

¹ Schopenhauer *Sammtliche Werke*, II. p. 22.

and "vivid". We, who see only the representations of reality, must remember that our impressions are necessarily "faint", and that our inner personality does not give an exhaustive knowledge of the world. Yet we could not know things at all without this power to sink in ourselves.

What reality is in itself—*quien sabe*? Such a question is unanswerable

§1.

WILL AS THE GROUND OF ALL PHENOMENA.

The ground of all phenomena is will unaccompanied by the intellect, irrational will, blind force in nature, blind impulse, unconscious striving toward existence in organic life. Impulses are grounded in conative effort and the feeling implication contains a form of craving. They are determined on the one side by unconscious automatic movement and attain to a higher development through the subject's perception of pains and pleasures.

In itself will is unconscious and its manifestation is only an accident. When, however, it becomes necessary for a more complete expression of will in nature, consciousness is added. "The will is the substance of man, the intellect the accident: the will is the matter, the intellect is the form; the will is warmth, the intellect is light."¹

Schopenhauer's world is a dream world. As in dreams strange ships float down the stream of consciousness constructed out of imagination which is will in the garb of a magician, so the varied representations, the material whereof is will, enter into the mental life. Man's coming to consciousness is but a horrible nightmare. He strives and suffers, longs yet dreads to escape. He opens his eyes upon his own creation, a world of beautiful form, sparkling in the radiance of a great light, yet when he examines into it, he finds that he and all creatures are but the sporadic growth of a decaying planet.

The basis of the world is will, never ceasing will, that manifests itself in myriads of forms. It is ever seeking to express itself. Higher and higher in degree, with mechanism more and more complicated, strange shapes crawl about the universe. Then consciousness comes and the organism out-

¹ *Schopenhauer Sammtliche Werke*, III p. 225.

wardly sees, and inwardly feels the great objectified will as surrounding nature. Until the reasoning eye of man beheld the universe, it was as though it had never been.

The will in the world supports itself through all changes. It is in man, and he is in it. It is in every form of nature that manifests itself to the intelligence of man. "Then we may assume that just as a system of impulses with corresponding feelings runs parallel with the vital processes in animal bodies, a similar but less highly developed inner life corresponds to plant-life; and furthermore, that something akin to this appears in the spontaneous movements of inorganic bodies, in chemical and crystalline processes, in processes of attraction and repulsion. And, perhaps, common opinion will now discover that it came very near this view, when it ascribed forces to all bodies alike as their inner essence; and defined force as a tendency to definite activity, and hence identical in its general form with an unconscious will."¹

§2.

WILL AS BLIND FORCE IN NATURE.

Schopenhauer recognized that what is will in higher animal life is force which germinates in the plant, which turns the needle to the pole, which holds us in our solar system, which makes the sun a thief, who

"with his great attraction
Robs the vast sea."

Matter is force and force is will. Every kind of activity in nature is identical with will. The lowest forms are the most universal forces of nature. In the organic realm there is as yet no individuality. Perception, the well-ordered and beautifully adjusted eye of the intellect is still closed.

The most complete scientific explanation of nature can only be an enumeration of labelled but unknown forces. We know effects and postulate causes, but the scientific world remains the phenomenal world and the nature of forces remains unexplained. The will equals all the forces of nature, recognized by science. All forces, chemical, biological, electrical, psychical, exhibit will. Yet will is never a cause, for cause is only relation among phenomena.

¹ *Paulsen*, Introduction to Philosophy, (tr.) p. 120.

Will is life and the principle of growth. It is constantly struggling to manifest itself. "All willing arises from want, therefore from deficiency, and therefore from suffering. The satisfaction of a wish ends it; yet "for one wish that is satisfied, there remain at least ten which are denied. Further the desire lasts long, the demands are infinite; the satisfaction is short and scantily measured out."¹

There is a great gulf between will in unorganized nature and will in human beings. The embryo world was covered with water and enveloped in gases. Life appeared changing form with changing conditions of the universe until man came. Unorganized nature moved by law; man, by motive. The forces of nature are the weakest manifestations of will, man is the highest. The scientists endeavored to reduce the forces to a unity, setting up one force and trying to change the others into it. Each force is but a different expression of will. Each character is but a different expression of will. As one character cannot change into another, so the reduction of one force to another is a false and vain endeavor. Schopenhauer had no intention of building up his system with regard to science, for science reconstructs experience in a rational way for intelligence alone. All that science can do is to seek out the causes of phenomena and observe that the difference in forces arises merely from the difference in the circumstances under which the force expresses itself.

Force in nature must be thought under the *concept* will. "If therefore, we refer the concept of *force* to that of *will*, we have in fact referred the less known to what is infinitely better known; indeed to the one thing that is really immediately and fully known to us, and have very greatly extended our knowledge."²

Every kind of active and operating force in nature is will. Blind, or unconscious, will can be active. "*Der einjährige Vogel hat keine Vorstellung von den Eiern, für die er ein Nest baut; die junge Spinne nicht von dem Raube, zu dem sie ein Netz wirkt; noch der Ameisenlöwe von der Ameise, der er zum ersten Male eine Grube grabt.*"³

¹ Schopenhauer, *Werke*, II, p. 230-231.

² Schopenhauer *Werke*, II, p. 133.

³ *Id.* p. 136.

Man pursues ends by the light of knowledge, but nature moves blindly, yet the propelling force in both cases is will. The inner nature of everything in the world is will. Commencing at the lowest grade of the objectification of the will, we find the forces of the universe. Whatever their apparent difference, they are manifestations of one will. They are not causes, but expressions, and they are groundless.

§3.

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL CAUSE OF THE FAILURE OF SCHOPENHAUER TO
GROUND THE NATURE OF THINGS IN HIS
POSITED REALITY.

“Phenomenal existence is idea and nothing more. All idea of whatever kind it may be, all object, is phenomenal existence, but the will alone is a *thing-in-itself*. As such, it is throughout not idea, but *toto genere* different from it; it is that of which all idea, all object, is the phenomenal appearance, the visibility, the objectification.”¹

The will is endless striving; “*ewig's Werden, endloser Fluss, gehort zur Offenbarung des Wesens des Willens.*”² The manifestations of will in time and space are innumerable. It is one, but its objectifications are many. Men of genius have tried to bring the immeasurable greatness of the material universe within the compass of man's comprehension yet the reality is greater than its expression.

Will is free from all the conditions that bind down phenomena. We cannot bring will wholly under subject and object. Schopenhauer's will is void of all distinctions, free from the principle of sufficient reason. He has given us a world-ground in a blind unconscious will but what we need is not a substance, a ground stuff but a cause. If this will is not a cause, then Schopenhauer has failed to ground the nature of things in his posited reality.

Schopenhauer has no intention of making will a cause. We are not to inquire for a cause of a force. Ask a man why he wills to live, and he cannot answer, as “will itself, the thing-in-itself, is without ground, for it lies outside the principle of sufficient reason.”³

¹ *Schopenhauer Werke*, II. p. 131.

² *Id.* p. 196.

³ *Schopenhauer Werke*, II, p. 194.

Reason seeks for an explanatory ground. It is not necessary for such a ground to be extended support or material "stuff", but it must determine the relations between selves and things, it must be an "agent", active, efficient and causal.

Changes occur in the phenomenal world. A ground for changes can be sought. The force which was the conditions of the change has no ground. Here Schopenhauer makes an error. Force is not a picture of a passive will. It is grounded in spontaneous, intelligent activity.

Schopenhauer's reality is one and indivisible. Its multiplicity lies in its manifestations. Man knows himself because he differentiates himself from the not-self. Schopenhauer's will has no principle of differentiation. The effect of its limited span of consciousness is like that of a candle light on the heavy, midnight blackness of a vast cathedral.

The world system does not spring from a void. The infinite is not a blank passivity, but a "basal causality by which the world is produced and maintained."¹ The world-ground is not blind will, shapeless and useless. It is intelligently active. The manifestation not only displays its own activity, but also the activity of the world-ground.

If the will of the world is not a cause it is unrelated, and we cannot grasp that which is unrelated: "World-ground can never be identified with Unrelated."² A world-ground must be the source of finite existence. "The process of becoming which the world exhibits to us is a sort of necessary 'drawing forth' of particular beings from the inscrutable but universal source of them all."³

Suppose we consider reality as non-intelligent. The infinite conditions the finite, but blind will could have no motive and no plan. The manifestations could not be depended upon to always appear thus and so. Sulphate of copper (CuSO_4), might not always, as a result of electrolysis, split up into copper and sulphuric acid ($\text{Cu} + \text{SO}_4$). The world-ground must be considered free, active and intelligent. The relation between the infinite and the finite must be such as between subject and object, each self-centered, yet related. "And developing self-consciousness,

¹ *Bowne*, *Metaphysics*, p. 93.

² *Ladd*, *Theory of Reality*, p. 499.

³ *Id* 500.

as well as the progressive seizure of the truth of the reality of things leads the mind of man to recognize that the ultimate Being of the World is its own indwelling and absolute spiritual Life,—the Life of a self-conscious Will and Mind which stands related to that complex of objects which are made known in all human experience, as their One and Ultimate Ground."¹

The logical abstraction, the empty concept of will which Schopenhauer offers as an unrelated non-productive reality, cannot take the place of the full rich reality which we *know* corresponds to our self-conscious activity as the over-powering heat and brightness of the midday sun to the faint, rosy light of early morning.

¹ *Ladd, Theory of Reality, p. 550.*

CHAPTER II.

THE ORIGIN OF FEELING AND ITS DEPENDENCE ON WILL.

The old dichotomy, thinking and willing, prevailed from the time of Aristotle. Kant espoused and defended the trichotomy, thinking, feeling and willing. "It is of importance, however, to that Kant's greatest service here to psychology is his constant clamor for the feelings as a distinct type of mental life, as well as recognizing the disparity between the other two forms."¹ However Tetens,² (1736—1805.) was the first philosopher to definitely separate feeling from the understanding and will. Schopenhauer would have all elements in consciousness reduced to will.

Feeling is one side of all mental phenomena. Hence every experience entering consciousness is felt. The more one feels, the more one lives.

"Thought is deeper than all speech,
Feeling deeper than all thought."

Feeling plays a very important, but unrecognized part in Schopenhauer's system, as the ground of his pessimism. He gives a very meagre account of feeling as something present in consciousness which "is not a concept, is not abstract rational knowledge."³ Whatever this may be it comes under the concept of feeling. In the wide sphere of this concept most heterogeneous elements rest side by side. Mental states so diverse as hunger, love hate, anger, are all known as feelings.

Feeling accompanies activity, hence Schopenhauer could not separate feeling from will until the highest stage of development was reached. The first forth-putting of activity in impulse or desire, reacts in pleasure or pain to the organism. Whether more than the pleasure-pain content conduces to growth, we shall inquire later. Here it is sufficient to say that the organism regards its pains and pleasures and recoils or advances accordingly.

Impulse is blind, instinct contains only an apparent end, but desire is a slight advance. It is developed from unsatisfied cravings, which conduce to effort to reach satisfaction as a goal. Desire is dissatisfaction trying to escape from itself. Its success is only momentary. Continued satisfaction brings satiation or boredom, which is only renewed suffering.

¹ *Buchner*, A Study of Kant's Psychology p. 76.

² *Ueberweg*, History of Philosophy, Vol. II. p. 119.

³ *Schopenhauer Werke*, II p. 61.

DEPENDENCE OF FEELING ON VOLITION.

"Where there is no excitation no stimulation, no action, there is no feeling."¹ Feeling and willing cannot be separated. Every feeling is an impulse and all willing is felt. Feeling exists in relation to the sensuous impulse which is the first appearance of active will in the organism. In this forth-putting of activity the will is not controlled by definite ends. Impulse is purposeful movement, suffused with feeling. Feeling here appears pointed with an end, more or less dimly imagined. Man multiplies his wants by temporary satisfactions. Impulses become more numerous as consciousness progresses.

On a higher plane, feeling is the subjective accompaniment of will. The sensuous feelings are directly due to the outgoing or incoming of the active will, pursuing satisfaction or recoiling from pain in the interest of the physical organism.

Feeling is a predominant factor in ideation, influencing the activity of the will in the recall of ideas and even in the fusion of ideas, by reference to the pleasure-pain tone.

Feeling is dependent upon action. Feeling itself does not determine an action. The impulse is toward a definite end. This end is pictured by the act of imagination. The felt image is followed by the rush of activity to or from it, according to the pleased or pained feeling. Feelings consist in mental excitement. They depend upon the activity of the mind in relating ideas.

²"Our activities are due to the objects which come within the range of our experience, and hence the feelings excited necessarily cluster about these objects." The connection of feeling with will is here shown, as the object becomes a *spring to action*.

The following quotation is an example of what Schopenhauer considers blind will in action. The plant responds to stimuli, of which it must have a certain "awareness", a dim feeling-consciousness. "In fact, in the life of plants the truth that will can exist without knowledge is apparent—one might say palpably recognizable. For here we see a decided effort

¹ Dewey, Psychology, p. 19.

² Dewey, Psychology, p. 275.

determined by wants, modified in various ways, and adapting itself to the difference of the circumstances, yet clearly without knowledge."

§2.

PSYCHOLOGY OF DESIRE.

Desire is related to and dependent on feeling, yet it is more than feeling. A dynamic element is present in desire, which feeling lacks. Wanting and willing are closely allied. Desire differs from impulse by having a definite end, and from instinct by concerning the self, the individual, rather than the species.

Desire is a complex development, a resultant of idea processes, feeling, in reference to a pleasure-pain content, and of the primary activity of the will. Inquiring as to the nature of desire, we find it is a "condition of consciousness in which knowledge of some object as possibly or actually related to our pleasures or pains, give rise to a feeling of longing and effort indicative of combined affective and conative activity."¹

The elements entering into desire are longing, craving, a general feeling of dissatisfaction, effort,—satisfaction. The higher the development of mind, the greater are the desires, and the more imperfect the satisfaction.

The psychical condition of desire is simply a feeling of want, dissatisfaction with the present state. If desire went no further it would be impulse, an attempt to escape from something unpleasant. Desire recognizes a difference between this state of want, and a here-to-fore experience state of satisfaction. Memory and imagination picture the former state and show the path by which it was obtained. Imagination holds this end in view, promising release from the present want.

Pain arising from want serves as a stimulus to action, and a physical impulse realizes the end. Motor impulses are indefinite, out-spread, unable to seek right channels. Experimentation shows the direct path to reach the desired end.

The kinds of desires would be many if they were classified according to the different objects. The usual classification is ²"according to the origin of the craving and the character of its satisfaction." We have³ (1) the sensuous impulse for food, and

¹ Ladd, *Psychology, Descriptive and Explanatory*, p. 603.

² Ladd, *Psychology, Descriptive and Explanatory* p. 607.

³ *Id.*

the consequently developed desire for food, and kindred bodily satisfactions; (2) the intellectual desires which find their satisfaction in mental exercise: (3) the æsthetical desires by which the contemplation of a beautiful object, leads to a desire to create, and the ethical desires, leading to the living of a good life; (4) the pathological desires, or those which are abnormal, and crave satisfactions though it brings pain.

§3.

WORLD VALUES IN TERMS OF FEELING.

Schopenhauer determined the value of the world in terms of feeling. He pronounced the world to be the worst of all possible worlds. It is founded on pain. The first and last expression of objectified will is pain. The world ought not to exist. Only a blind will would objectify itself. A will accompanied by knowledge "needs optimism" as an excuse for its appearance. Man, instead of being called to account for the way in which he has spent this miserable existence, should demand why he was drawn forth from the quiet of the Nothing.

"What! out of senseless Nothing to provoke
A conscious Something to resent the yoke
Of unpermitted Pleasure, under pain
Of Everlasting Penalties, if broke."

It is a world of unrelieved misery from the cradle to the grave. The suffering is heightened in man by the gift of knowledge. Yet there are some who would apply the concept *good* to this Hades in which we dwell.

The optimism of the philosopher, Leibnitz, "conflicts with the palpable misery of existence".¹ The world was created by a wise and good God. It is therefore the best of all possible worlds. The best world is the most orderly, harmonious, and beautiful. Hence the world in which we live must be the most orderly, as to the relations of its parts and activities, the most harmonious, as to design and finish, the most beautiful in its manifestation.²

To Schopenhauer optimism is a "really wicked way of thinking, as a bitter mockery of the unspeakable suffering of humanity"³

Life flows continually between willing and obtaining. To will is pain, because willing arises from want, deficiency, therefore pain. To take a different view; willing is the putting forth of activity. There is pleasure in willing. Craving is not necessarily painful. "A specific type of life and the exercise of the same is the real aim of all life and striving."⁴

¹ *Schopenhauer Werke*, III, p. 205.

² Bowen, *Modern Philosophy*, p. 104.

³ *Id.* II, p. 385.

⁴ *Paulsen*, *Introduction to Philosophy*, (tr.) p. 422.

CHAPTER III.

THE DAWN OF INTELLIGENCE.

Desire in its higher development comes under the control of an awakened perception, which cognizes an end from an experienced pleasure-pain content of consciousness. In this aroused consciousness the will becomes aware of itself.

In self-consciousness the will comes face to face itself for the first time. Man's body is manifested to him in two ways; as an object among other objects in perception; and as an active subject or will. The corporeal being is known as one substance appearing to sense-perception as an object, and to internal perception as the reality behind the appearance, the noumenon, which is the ground of the phenomenon. We have been dealing with a blind will which has suddenly had sight bestowed and beholds itself as a struggling suffering reality. In becoming self-conscious, man has discovered the essence of his own reality in will. He is will, and beholds himself in the objectified volitions of all his movements. Even his unconscious volitions are expressed in terms of muscles, organs, and the whole body. The will which objectifies itself in this presentation is for the most part unconscious. Self-consciousness is after all only an accident in the manifestation of the volitions of animals. This internal perception in man is a key to the thing-in-itself, which lies behind or beneath phenomena.

The intellect is an implement in the service of the will to discover the means of satisfying its desires. In the lowest animal life is the awareness of desire, but there is no search light cast over the troubled waters and dark sky of the future to provide for the safety and wants of this organic form.

§1.

THE MIRROR OF THE WILL.

The will comes face-to-face with itself in deeds and in conduct. The tragedy of human life, history not brute life or nature, show the will itself. Reality breaks out; will comes to itself in self-consciousness.

The will created its intellect, made the mirror in which it views itself. In its lowest degree it showed itself in nature as

blind force, in its highest, it is a human body provided with brain, nervous system, and the possibility of sensations. Now it can will with a knowledge of ends.

This will is constantly striving to reach an impossible goal, the satisfaction of its desires. All the myriad forms of the universe are expressions of the struggling, continually active will. In unorganized matter it is the original force which it is the province of scientist to investigate. The light of the intellect illumines the path of the will. Man discovers his inner nature to be will, or rather, will discovers itself, and henceforth controls the mechanism of the universe.

The will delights to see itself in every phase of life, but particularly in its highest form, as self-conscious man. Poetry affords a valuable study of man. It is a criticism of the life of the will and portrays man more fully than either plastic or pictorial art. "The revelation of the Idea, which is the highest grade of the objectivity of will, the representation of man in the connected series of his efforts and actions is thus the great problem of poetry."¹ The ideal is ever before the poet and his delineation is true. His province is to express a harmony between the real and the ideal.

Tragedy is the summit of poetical art. In tragedy we have the representation of the real and terrible side of life. "The unspeakable pain, the wail of humanity, the triumph of evil, the scornful mastery of chance, and the irretrievable fall of the just and innocent is here presented to us; and in this lies a significant hint of the nature of the world and of existence."² Tragedy show the strife of will with itself.

In lyrics the poet mirrors the will with its feelings, in the drama he shows the deeds of the will as well as what it feels.

The poet represents characters in significant situations. This the historian cannot do. He must take things as he finds them, judging importance of acts by the age in which they occurred. Even the biographers give a better portrait of will life. The difference between history and biography is like the difference in a view of nature from a mountain top, and a study of the same scene in the company of a botanist or mineralogist.

History is to the nation what reason is to man. A nation

¹ *Schopenhauer Werke*, II, p. 288.

² *Id.* p. 298.

must know its past to draw inference as to the future expectation and conduct. Reason in man raises him above the brutes whose life is mainly in the present.

§2.

SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS AND OBJECTIVE CONSCIOUSNESS AS CORRELATIVE TERMS.

Subject and object are not related as cause and effect. They are but the two-fold aspect of an indivisible thing. "That which know all things and is known by none is the subject."¹ Neither one creates the other. Object exists only for the subject and subject for the object. That which is known must have a knower, and the knower must have the known as the ground of its being. The forms of cognition which belong to the subject are time, space and causation. Object and subject precede the possibility of all knowledge

How are we ever to know the subject as subject? It cannot appear except as object. Knowledge of the subject alone is impossible. Subject and object are one and the same appearance in different aspects.

We know of the subject because it wills something. We know of the object because it furnishes resistance to this will. The antithesis of force and resistance thus furnishes a common basis for the knowledge of the reality of ourselves, and for that of the reality of other things. We recognize the will within as the true reality and the resistance from which we know the reality of other things must therefore be likewise will

Until Kant appeared all philosophers reasoned on the objective side, without investigating the authority of the intellect. Knowledge gained on the objective side must take for granted the correctness of the mental mechanism in gaining truth.

Subject, which is self-consciousness, is destined to the comprehension of relations in the interest of will. The object, as object, is clear and distinct to it, yet it has only a surface-knowledge. It cannot penetrate to the real beneath experience. The Ego does not know itself, and has only a mediate knowledge of its own mechanism.

What is the subject involved in all knowing? The subject of every act of knowledge,—is my will. The object toward

¹ *Schopenhauer Werke*. II p. 5.

which it is directed is also will. There is but one will in the universe. Subject and object are one.

Schopenhauer makes thought and being identical. Both epistemology and metaphysics must have as a basis an experiential real, as opposed to a real that is merely thought. There are things and there are selves. They find their reality in an active will which is the world-ground. The self knows things, by projecting the knowledge of itself as a willing being into the things that inhibit the self.

It is true for cognition that subject and object are correlative terms. They are reciprocally connected in consciousness. The existence of one depends upon the existence of the other.

§3.

CONTRADICTIONS IN SCHOPENHEUER'S SYSTEM SHOWING THE SUBSTITUTION OF CONSCIOUS ACTIVITY AS A WORLD-GROUND.

Schopenhauer's implication that the reality of the object is in total dependence upon the self-activity of the subject is only valid for thought. There is a real object sustained by an active world-ground.

Every act is dependent on mind coming in contact with an external object. We do not come to self-consciousness without having experience. Self-consciousness is dependent. Every act of knowledge is dependent in the presence of an object. Yet knowledge of the subject is not identical with the knowledge of objects. We find the idea of self among the ideas of objects in consciousness. We know that the self is more than its idea. We know that the object is more than its idea. I know that the self is *my* willing, and that the object is willing, but not *my* willing. This differentiation makes knowledge possible.

That which we know as existing we know as active. A thing can be known as active only as it is a cause of changes. Therefore, to know will, we must know it as causal and active. Schopenhauer denies that the will in the world is a cause of anything. If it is not causal, the will in the world and the will in activity are not identical, and we have not found a reality in Schopenhauer's will, but merely an abstraction.

We have an intelligent will rather than a blind one. If this were not so, will could have no aim in manifestation. It would not construct a brain by which it might comprehend its

relations to an external world. The spontaneity of the activity of the brain is conferred by will. It cannot confer what it has not. Hence the unconscious will must possess potentially spontaneous or intelligent activity.

The intellect is of a subordinate nature. This is proved by the fact that everything is done so much better by unconscious volitions than by the bungling consciousness of man.

The will of Schopenhauer corresponds to the soul of other philosophers, though it is a larger conception. The will is not bound to a special organ, as the intellect to the brain. That which moves the body is will. That which appears as body is a manifestation of will. That which supports and environs the body is will.

The world is conditioned by the knowing subject. Will can only be perceived under all the conditions of the idea, as phenomenon. Matter is constructed by self-conscious activity. Out of it come all forms and shapes or species. Only in conscious activity can matter exist at all. Matter is activity. That which exhibits itself is only matter acting in some determined way. It is will which has become visible. We cannot know will except as it objectifies itself and enters the forms of perception. Of what use is such a will? It is only self-conscious activity that drags it forth from the Nothing

Weil jegliches Wesen in der Natur zugleich Erscheinung und Ding an sich, oder auch *natura naturata* und *natura naturans*, ist; so ist es demgemäss einer zwiefachen Erklärung fähig, einer physischen und einer metaphysischen. Die physische ist allemal aus der Ursache; die metaphysische allemal aus dem Willen: den dieser ist es, der in der erkenntnisslosen Natur sich darstellt als Naturkraft, höher hinauf als Lebenskraft, in Thier und Mensch aber den Nanan Willen erhält.

Schopenhauer, (Vol. 6, §64, ch. 4, p. 97.)

PART II.

DEVELOPMENT OF WILL AND IDEA.

CHAPTER I.

SCHOPENHAUER'S ESTIMATE OF MENTAL MECHANISM SHOWING THE STATE OF PSYCHOLOGY IN HIS DAY.

Perception in its finished state gives an elementary knowledge of self, things and the relation between them. The knowledge of things is brought about by the predominance of sensuous elements, while that of self is developed through idea trains. Attention focused upon certain states in consciousness, because of affective or volitional content, tends to separate them from the idea-mass. Such states are localized as self, as subject, to which other states are opposed as object.

How do we know self? Perception comes forward with the answer produced by the ideating process. How do we know things? Perception answers even more definitely by referring to the sensation-complexes. What is the relation between the self and things. The knowledge of relation also arise in the association of ideas. There is a relation between ideas of interdependence and of likeness and difference, yet the whole mass is unified by the activity of consciousness. If such relations exist, and such a unification is possible in the idea-mass, we infer that the sensation mass, localized in space and time, in the same way is a unified whole, with interrelations among the parts.

The above very modern theory of perception serves as a measure of Schopenhauer's estimate. The will objectifies itself in a two-fold way, as subject and object. The subject is the internal sense, consciousness. The object is body. All things are manifestations of the will, and as ideas they become objects of knowledge. Sensations give data and the understanding by a swift stroke from effect to cause gives ideas to perception. The forms of perception are space and time. Hence the phenomenal world, the only world we know, is in space and time. Causation fills space and time. Matter is causation. Only as active does it exist.

The object is not the thing-in-itself,, but as phenomenon it is real. Sensation is not perception. Indeed, the part played by the senses is small compared to the work of the understanding. With its one function it relates effect to cause, and supplies the perception ideas.

The objective senses are sight, which affects the will least, hearing, and touch. The subjective senses are taste and smell. They directly affect the will agreeably or disagreeably.

*“Hier aber liegt für Sinne und Verstand die Welt offen da, giebt sich mit naiver Wahrheit für Das, was sie ist, für anschauliche Vorstellung, welche gesessmassig am Bande der Kausalität sich entwickelt.”*¹

There are two kinds of ideas, those of perception, and abstract ideas, which belong to man alone. Concepts are a distinct class of ideas. They cannot come “before the eyes or the imagination like objects of perception.” We perceive their effects in language and science. Animals have perception and understanding, but no abstract ideas, no concepts for reason.

Concepts find their ground in perception, “for the whole world of reflection rests on the world of perception as its ground of knowledge”.²

While a concept can hold many abstract ideas under it, this is not a special characteristic. It exists potentially. Concepts have something in common. Recognition of this relation is called judgment. Overlapping spheres of concepts give rise to trains of syllogisms.

In order to follow the actual process by which perception-ideas (“representative images”) become generalized, that is, converted into concepts, we take Dr. Ladd’s account: “the development of thought reacts upon the reproductivity; the mental states lose their concrete and life-like resemblance to particular originals which they reproduce; the consciousness of the more universal relations in which the particular ideas stand to each other becomes more prominent; the mental synthesis, which every complex field of consciousness actually is, now becomes more determined by the character of these general relations; and finally, the symbol of this result of accomplishing an intellectual combination—namely, the word—stands as one individual

¹ *Schopenhauer Werke*, II. p. 18.

² *Id.* p. 48.

and concrete remainder of the multitude of visual, tactual, auditory, and other images."¹

The pure concepts Kant calls categories. These are introduced as forms of the understanding, just as space and time belong to perception. Kant finds it necessary to deduce or justify his twelve categories, because they are not founded on experience, and apply to objects generally. The office of the categories is to unite concepts, or to bring together perception ideas.

Kant tried to construct a Transcendental Logic that would supplement his happily-discovered Transcendental Æsthetic. He took the table of judgments and formed twelve categories. Then he found it necessary to add the *Schema*, in other words, to call imagination to his aid, to travel back and forth from the concept to perception to verify the judgment.

Schopenhauer rejected the whole doctrine of the categories. He retained the one category, that of causality. Changes take place and are connected. "But the law of causation receives its meaning and necessity only from this, that the essence of change does not consist simply in the mere variation of things, but rather in the fact that at the same part of space there is now one thing and then another, and at one and the same point of time there is here one thing and there another: only this reciprocal limitation of space and time by each other gives meaning, and at the same time necessity to a law, according to which change must take place."²

Schopenhauer considered that of the twelve Kantian categories, eleven were blind windows. Only that of causality gave light.

For a framework of reality we need more than the category of causality. The function of a category is not to hold before the understanding a finished picture, but all the categories working in unison relate the representations in perception into a real. "There are certain general conceptions which make up at once the framework of knowledge and the framework of existence. Such are the categories of being and cause, change and identity, space and time; and our knowledge of particular

1 Ladd, *Psychology, Descriptive and Explanatory*, p. 440.

2 Schopenhauer, *Werke*, II, p. 11.

things will depend on the conception we form of these basal categories."¹

That space and time belong to the function of perceiving has been practically established since the time of Kant. Is space dependent or independent? The answer to the question is for realism or idealism. Common-sense says it is an independent reality in which things exist and move. It has no interest in its content, and remains, whether empty or full.

Bowne, who is influenced by Lotze, makes objections to the naive realism. If space be real, it must be a determining factor in the system of things. Unless it is in active interaction with other things its existence cannot be distinguished from non-existence. Yet to view space as an active thing among things, is not possible, for space is rather a "place for a thing" than a thing. That which exists out of relations to things cannot make known its existence. Therefore space must manifest itself in the active construction of the universe, or be relegated to the realm of nothing.

According to Prof. James, the original space sensation is a feeling of vastness. The intellect makes the sub-divisions. All the data which can be attended to at once is localized as belonging to the predominate sensation, and this is specialized as the thing. "The sensations contributing to space perception seem exclusively to be the surface of the skin, retina and joints."²

Time-consciousness like that of space is the result of mental growth. Bowne defines the popular view of time as an existence independent of things. Our mental life bears witness to the reality of time, because mental experience shows a *then* and *now*. Intelligence makes this order possible. In the "flow" of time there must be something timeless by which to measure succession. This is given in the act of perception. In its immediate grasp it is both spaceless and timeless.³

Sensation is a mere datum for the understanding. Out of it understanding gives perception its ideas. All causality is in the understanding alone. The world of objects is idea. No more can be known about it, as each object exhausts itself in becoming idea.

¹ Bowne, *Metaphysics*, p. 1.

² James, *The Principles of Psychology*, Vol. II, p. 268.

³ Bowne, *Metaphysics*, p. 129.

As understanding starts from simple sensation, changes must take place. The objectified objects of the will must act upon each other or perception would not be possible. Understanding makes possible perception by relating cause and effect. All animals as well as men possess understanding, knowledge of causality. Deficiency of this knowledge is stupidity. How far understanding is independent of reason may be observed in animals who unlike man, possess no reasoning power. There is a lack of memory in the brute which limits the range of his intelligence. Memory is dependent on concepts. The mere animal memory is ever in perception.

Reason depends upon concepts. All that is unimportant in perception, falls away and leaves what is essential in mere abstract,—a word. Reason is bound up with speech. Reason speaks to reason, without perception ideas being called. However each concept must be supported by perceptions. Man does not know what he cannot express. His percepts have not become concepts. His knowledge is of no use to him. When the percepts become abstract knowledge, he can communicate his thoughts.

The province of reason is investigation. It has only the forms of its operations. Understanding relates cause and effect. It knows in perception directly, but perception refers to the immediate present. Here reason comes in and substitutes concepts for percepts.

¹“Reason is needed in the full stress of life, where quick conclusions, bold action, rapid and sure comprehension are required, but it may easily spoil all if it gains the upper hand, and by perplexing hinder the intuition, direct discovery, and grasp of the right by simple understanding, and thus induce irresolution.”

¹ *Schopenhauer, Werke*, II, p. 68.

CHAPTER II.

THE EVOLUTION OF RATIONAL WILL.

"Revolving worlds, revolving systems, yea,
 Revolving firmaments, nor there we end:
 Systems of firmaments revolving send
 Our thought across the Infinite astray,
 Gasping and lost and terrified, the day
 Of life, the goodly interests of home,
 Shrivelled to nothing; that unbounded dome
 Peeling still on, in blind fatality.

No rest is there for our soul's winged feet,
 She must return for shelter to her ark—
 The body, fair, frail death-born, incomplete,
 And let her bring this truth back from the dark:
 Life is self-centered, man is nature's god;
 Space, time, are but the walls of his abode."

In the lowest grade we have the weakest objectification of the will. Will objectifies itself more distinctly as it ascends. When the individual becomes so complicated that stimuli does not generate sufficient or frequent enough movement for a performance of its functions, consciousness appears.

Will is more than mere force. It is free from all conditions of phenomena, that is, free from the conditions of the principle of sufficient reason. It is known immediately in self-consciousness. It is blind, active, ceaseless, free from all the categories.

Will is nothing but struggle. It triumphs over and creates nature. It makes itself into objects. The world before us, that scientists investigate,—that world is will. The body that I see and feel,—that body, my body, is will. The I within me,—that also is will.

In the beginning there was nothing but will. Will manifested itself in its violence as a great whirling mass of flame, and the universe was born, with its endlessly revolving systems, and the will was the earth, and the boiling sea, and the vapor, and the will was the deep ocean, and the thinning cloud-bank, and the shining sun, and the pale moon; and the will was the calm sea, and the green land, and the life in both; and the will was all sentient things; and the will was man. Before

man came, consciousness had been added. But with man came self-consciousness, and the will viewed itself and saw its work. In some such way would Schopenhauer explain the evolution of a rational will.

Man's will gives him a key to the nature of his environment, as well as shows him the inner mechanism of his being. His body is both an object for perception, that is, an idea, and also will, which is immediately known in consciousness. Every act of the body is an expression of will. The body itself is the objectification of the will. Every impression of the body affects the will directly as painful or pleasurable.

All things are through **and** through will. Every movement in our bodies, every movement in nature, is an expression of will. Involuntary movements of our bodies are not from motives but from stimuli. A physiological account of the body does not detract from the philosophical truth that the body is only a manifestation of will.

Once man has grasped the idea that he is will, he will recognize this will in selves, animals, plants, unorganized nature and all forces manifested in nature.

The will, as a thing in itself is free. In self-consciousness the will is known directly, so that in consciousness is consciousness of the freedom of the will. Every one thus believes himself to be free, but like any object of nature, he is determined by necessity.

"The lowest grades of the objectification of will are to be found in those most universal forces of nature which partly appear in all matter without exception, as gravity and impenetrability, and partly have shared the given matter among them, so that certain of them reign in one species of matter and others in another species, constituting its specific difference, as rigidity, fluidity, elasticity, electricity, magnetism, chemical properties and qualities of every kind"¹

These are the manifestations of the will, just as human actions. We cannot demand a cause for the manifestation of forces. This force is groundless.

Will objectifies itself in space and time. If space and time are forms of the intellect, how can will objectify itself? Time,

¹ *Schopenhauer, Werke*, II, p. 154.

space and causality do not belong to the will or to the idea, but to their particular phenomena.

The will is never a cause. Every act can be explained under the principle of sufficient reason. It is never necessary to appeal to original force.¹

In the lowest grade will is blind striving, obscure, impulse. Then it appears as blind, unconscious striving in unorganized nature. From grade to grade it objectifies itself more distinctly until consciousness becomes necessary, and appears as an "agent". The world which has up to this time been will, now becomes idea.

The "inner necessity" for the gradation of the manifestations of the will, is expressed by an "outer necessity". Man needs beasts. In their turn, they need each other and plants. Plants need the ground, and such climatic conditions as the earth affords. The will lives on itself.

²"In the system of Kant, the psychological aspects of volition are for the most part unnoticed, while the metaphysical and moral aspects appear prominently."

Kant does little more for the will in his *Kritik der reinen Vernunft* than to make a place for practical reason, the moral law. For this purpose he introduced transcendental freedom, placing freedom in the noumenon.

³"I have, therefore, first to remark that for the present I shall use the concept of freedom in its practical meaning only, taking no account of the other concept of freedom in its transcendental meaning, which cannot be presupposed empirically as an explanation of phenomena, but is itself a problem of reason and has been disposed of before. A will is purely *animal* (*arbitrium brutum*) when it is determined by nothing but sensuous impulses, that is *pathologically*. A will, on the contrary, which is independent of sensuous impulses, and can be determined therefore by motives presented by reason alone, is called *Free-will* (*arbitrium liberum*), and everything connected with this, whether as cause or effect, is called *practical*. Practical freedom can be proved by experience. For human will is not determined

¹ Here Schopenhauer introduces a will that is not identical with the will in the world-ground. This will displays its activity; the ground will is not the cause of anything. A thing cannot enter a series without causing. That which does nothing, is nothing.

² Alexander, *Theories of the Will*, p. 257.

³ Kant *Werke*, III, p. 529.

by that only which excites, that is, immediately affects the senses; but we possess the power to overcome the impressions made on the faculty of our sensuous desires, by representing to ourselves what, in a more distant way, may be useful or hurtful."

Everything in the phenomenal world is determined, but the will is autonomous. As the will is independent man can only think of his own will as a free cause.

While Schopenhauer admits that Kant here did ethics a great service, by freeing that subject from the world of experience, he also censures him for not allowing true moral worth to any action which does not arise from a sense of duty.

Kant has very little to say about the will except where he needs it for his moral law. On the other hand Schopenhauer has *all* to say about will.

Schopenhauer separated will from intellect. Previously will had been conditioned upon intellect. The body is represented in rational perception. Volition and action of the body are identical. Every act of the body is the objectified act of the will. Thus the whole body equals will objectified, brought in the sphere of perception.

The idea is the immediate objectification of the will. Ideas are stages of objectification. The lowest stage is force in nature. The higher stages are plants, animals, men.

The will which in the plant forms the flower, and in man forms the intellect, is the same will that manifests itself as forces in unorganized nature.

The whole scheme of changes is a matter of attraction and repulsion, in the subject-matter of mechanics as well as in conscious beings. The will-to-live which is in all things has only care for the preservation of the species.

The knowing subject knows both body and its own essence. Also it knows other bodies, like self, and different. It can look down the scale and see the objectifications growing weaker at each stage, until unorganized nature is reached.

All things are in will; will is in all things. It is blind force in nature, impulse for the individual, instinct for the species, desire for both, feeling, consciousness: knowing or self-consciousness. This is an unhappy world, where life swings to and fro between craving or pain and temporary satisfaction.

Man is endowed with perception and understanding in common with the brutes, but in addition he is given the power to form concepts, to judge, to reason. This gift but makes him more unhappy, increasing his desires.

There is a way to escape suffering. The contemplation of the ideal,—the idea, or manifestation of the will at the moment of objectification,—frees feeling from will. The knowing subject sinks into the pure *what* of things, ceasing to will.

Idea and object are identical in the first book of Schopenhauer's "World as Will and Idea," but in the third book we have a different idea, the pure type of things, the will at the moment of objectification,

The rational will regulates its impulses by reason. Character is the highest outcome. Man is not free. His acts are determined.

Such a will theory brings Schopenhauers system to pessimism and pantheism. There is no place for knowledge; no use for an Absolute.

The way of salvation is through denial of the will-to-live. Here man draws into the reality of his inner essence. Here without willing, he can escape suffering until the blessed annihilation of death overtakes him. Reduce life to the nothingness whence it came, and Nirvana is reached.

According to ¹Wundt, volition is the result of a process, every step of which must be taken into consideration. The *end* of the action must not be regarded and isolated but the whole process, with its feelings and emotions is to be considered. There are no ideas that do not occasion feelings and impulses, while every feeling and impulse refers to some "ideated object"

People's interest is taken up in the action to the detriment of acute observation. The older psychologists did not observe with sufficient accuracy. "External acts of will are the only ones in the whole sphere of volitional processes that force themselves emphatically on the attention of the observer."² The result has been to limit will to external volitional acts.

Will became abstracted as a concept, and then was made the cause of everything. This abstract will-theory of Schopenhauer has had a pernicious effect. An "unconscious" will is

¹ Wundt, Outlines of Psychology, (tr.) p. 14.

² Wundt, Outlines of Psychology, p. 194.

posited which appears in consciousness in the volition.

To learn anything about the will, it is necessary to observe the volitional process as it is given to us in consciousness, immediate experience. It is not a concept, but a process in consciousness. All that we know of it is what we perceive. "We can know nothing of an unconscious, or, what amounts to the same thing for psychology, a material process, which is not even perceived, but merely assumed hypothetically on the basis of metaphysical presuppositions."¹

¹ *Id.* p. 196.

CHAPTER III.

THE SECESSION OF FEELING FROM WILL.

Schopenhauer anticipated the theory of evolution. The struggles of will are remarkably in accordance with the doctrine of evolution. He approaches the Darwinian theory in his grades of the will. The ape is placed on the grade below man, and it is shown how nature improved by giving man the hand retained from the ape.¹

Schopenhauer concludes that "each more highly organized state of matter has succeeded a cruder state, so that the lower animals existed before man, fishes before land animals, plants before fishes, and the unorganized before all that is organized; that consequently, the original mass had to pass through a long series of changes before the first eye could be open."²

Nature exists through constant strife. The ideas of each grade struggle for victory. Each fights for the matter, space and time of the other. A new Idea arises from the struggle, holding in subjection, as part of its being, the inferior ideas.

In the ascending series of animals, we find the nervous and muscular systems separating more and more distinctly, until in man we have a complete nervous system, crowned by a complicated brain apparatus.

Here it is well to supplement Schopenhauer's physiology by a clearer explanation. The nervous system stands between the senses and the world, and is the precondition of sensation; hence the first physiological condition of perception. The brain and the spinal cord belong to the cerebro-spinal system. The brain is divided into "hind-brain", with medulla oblongata below and cerebellum above; the mid-brain, with optic lobes; and the fore-brain, with optic thalamus below and cerebral hemispheres above. There are two kinds of nerves connected with this central nervous system, sensory to bring impressions from without, and motor to carry impulses from within. The impressions are transmitted by the nerve fibres. There is a secondary or a sympathetic nervous system connected with the cerebro-spinal system by special nerves. The spinal cord contains reflex centres.

¹ *Schopenhauer, Werke*, III, p. 317.

² *Id.* II, p. 35.

Impressions are carried to it by the sensory nerves, and, without going to the brain, they are sent to some muscle through the motor nerves. The medulla oblongata is the centre of vital reflex action.

The integrity of the nervous system depends upon the blood supply. A large quantity of blood is sent to all the organs adapted for receiving impressions, especially the central organs. "Thus in the case of man, although the brain has not ordinarily more than about one-fortieth or the weight of the body, yet it is estimated to receive from one-sixth to one-fifth of the whole circulating blood."¹

Schopenhauer recognizes the importance of the blood supply; "the will objectifies itself most immediately in the blood as that which originally makes and forms the organism, perfects it by growth, and afterwards constantly maintains it, both by the regular renewal of all the parts and by the extraordinary restoration of any part that may have been injured. The first productions of the blood are its own vessels, and then the muscles, in the irritability of which the will makes itself known to self-consciousness; but with this also the heart, which is at once vessel and muscle, and therefore is the true centre and *primum mobile* of the whole life."²

Wundt turns feelings into three directions³, pleasurable and unpleasurable, arousing and subduing, strain and relaxation. A feeling may belong to one, two or all of these directions.

"Of the chief directions of feelings mentioned above especially that of *pleasurable* and *unpleasurable* feelings can be shown to stand in regular relation to the pulse. When the feeling is pleasurable the pulse is accelerated and weakened."⁴

It is very difficult to reach feelings. We can only have ideas or them. Feeling is not a derivative form. It is a consciousness of all processes in mental life.

The conditions of feeling as pleasure or pain can be investigated, but not higher feelings. They can only be interpreted. The physiological condition is neural processes in the central organs.

1 *Carpenter* Mental Physiology, (1893) p. 39.

2 *Schopenhauer, Werke*, III, p. 289.

3 *Wundt*, Outlines of Psychology (tr.) p. 83. 4 *Id.* p. 37.

There are three factors in feeling, those of conation, cognition and feeling. Consciousness attends to these in following the volitional, ideational, and feeling processes.

Feelings are important in the development of mental life. They are capable of being varied in quantity and differ qualitatively. Ideas operate upon the feeling, and the feeling influences the ideation processes.

There are massive pleasurable feelings produced by physical comfort, and a quietly pleasant feeling which accompanies low-toned mental activity, as in reverie.

Sentiments are feelings full of ideas. They arise on the presentation of ideals, "complex constructions of imagination and thought which the developed mind holds before itself as types or patterns of what is not, but what ought to be."¹ They are conceptions of the Ego freed from bodily dependence.

Certain objects are caught and held by the mind in contemplation. These give rise to a pleasurable feeling, that of "the beautiful".

The object held in contemplation may be an object for perception, as beautiful scenery, or art, or even our own imaginative structure. No one who lacks imagination can gain æsthetic feelings. One creates the viewed object by the activity of one's own imagination. Before the object the mind preserves a contemplative attitude. Any thought entering to relate the object to self-interest, destroys the æsthetic feeling. Even the æsthetic feeling itself cannot be analyzed or attended to. When it becomes an object it disappears or entirely changes its nature. Æsthetic consciousness has the power to form ideals.

In the contemplation of the eternal ideas, the sensuous feelings are lost. The subject enters upon pure will-less, time-less knowledge. There is no causality, hence no matter; no will no suffering. The subject sinks into the pure what of things. The one veil that concealed reality, that of time, is torn down. The subject has a direct intuition of itself as Subject, and there is no Object. This feeling cannot be turned back upon the self. There can be no enjoyment of possession in an art object. It cannot be subordinated to ends.

Æsthetic consciousness may know will in terms of doing. The relation of knowing and being is close. In the contem-

¹ Ladd, *Psychology, Descriptive and Explanatory*, p. 561.

plation of the Idea, willing ceases. Things are comprehended free from personal interest. Peace comes with the surrender of individuality.

"In the æsthetical mode of contemplation we have found two inseparable constituent parts,—the knowledge of the object not as individual thing but as Platonic Idea, that is, as the enduring form of this whole species of things; and the self-consciousness of the knowing person, not as individual, but as pure will-less subject of knowledge."¹

The psychology of æsthetics is difficult to formulate. The sensuous agreeable feeling passes into the æsthetical sentiment by the constructive work of the imagination. Thus this sentiment is a development or growth. "This so 'contemplative attitude', which we find ourselves obliged to take toward objects that excite the feeling of the beautiful, is one of the most interesting and marvellous of psychological phenomena."²

The psychological ground of the æsthetical sentiment, though Schopenhauer does not make it so, is self-consciousness.

No objectified volition is a perfect representation of its class. It is the contemplation of this type, given in the expression of pure idea that constitutes the æsthetic feeling. Man loses his individuality in ecstatic contemplation of the beautiful in art or nature. Thus he is without will, and without suffering. The idea as objectified will, having a sensuous basis from its incorporation into perception, has through a process of evolution, come to be the pure, free type, the unreachable goal of all aiming.

The kind of æsthetical satisfaction depends upon whether the Idea contemplated is of a high or low grade. If the subject is inorganic nature, viewed in paintings or in natural scenery the pleasure of knowing will predominate: but if animals and man are the subject of study, the delight will centre in the Idea, for here the will itself in its highest grade is revealed.

There are two sides to æsthetic contemplation, the subjective and objective. Light gives great delight entirely based on the subjective ground of æsthetic pleasure.

That which is only *charming* or *attractive* is too near the will to excite it. We are freed from the miserable will in pleasure derived from beauty, in the consolation of art, and the enthu-

¹ Schopenhauer, *Werke*, II. p. 230.

² Ladd, *Psychology, Descriptive and Explanatory*, p. 572.

siasm of the artist. Yet the artist is lonely on account of difference from other men. He is compensated for his loneliness by his consciousness of the Idea. He holds to the Idea, and surrenders suffering will. This Idea is direct object, though it is yet the will itself before it becomes Idea for perception.

There is a marked philosophical character in Schopenhauer's treatment of the will. He has an intuitive apprehension of the world-ground in Art. He attempts to show the relation between man's æsthetical experience and his determination of reality. The doctrine of the beautiful is connected with the doctrine of the real. Both Browning and Wagner are indebted to Schopenhauer.

CHAPTER IV.

THE EVOLUTION OF THE IDEA.

Every universal force of nature is only a low grade of the objectification of will, and we call every such grade an "eternal Idea" in Plato's sense. Through time and space the Idea* multiplies itself in phenomena, but the law of causality limits it in accordance to the time, space, and matter assigned. They are directed to the same matter, and appear and disappear to make room for each other. Will is the force of nature, manifesting itself in phenomena. At the moment of objectification, time and space bring multiplicity, causality determines the position of these phenomena. At this moment the Idea of the grade of objectivity can be seized and contemplated.

Because the will is the same will, the Ideas cannot be reduced to identity, but where several Ideas struggle to obtain a particular portion of matter, there arises from the conflict a higher Idea which swallows up the inferior ones and yet is strengthened by them. Hence will is objectified in an entirely novel way, and new forces appear on earth. The diversity of the Ideas make the grades of objectification.

"The objectivity of knowledge, and primarily of perceptive knowledge, has innumerable grades, which depend upon the energy of the intellect and its separation from the will, and the highest of which is genius, in which the comprehension of the external world becomes so pure and objective that to it even more reveals itself directly in the individual thing, than the individual thing itself, namely, the nature of its whole species, i. e., its Platonic Idea; which is brought about by the fact that in this case the will entirely vanishes from consciousness."

The world as Idea is the complete mirror of the world. This is Idea in the Platonic sense and it is more especially for the genius. Intelligence gradually frees itself from the will. The complete *loosening* appears only in the genius.

*This Idea is not the same Idea as appears in the perception, and which appears in Book I, of the "World as Will and Idea" as a correlative of the object. This Idea is an abstraction.

1 Schopenhauer, *Sammtliche Werke*. III XXII, p. 331.

Ideas are broken up into multiplicity and appear for the knowledge of the subject as individual in space and time. Under the name of science they proceed according to the principle of sufficient reason. The difference between a concept and an idea is that the concept is a dead receptacle, and an idea develops other ideas.

Knowledge breaks from the subjection of the will, and is free to contemplate the pure *what* of things, by the subject ceasing to be individual.

¹ "What is knowledge? It is primarily and essentially idea. What is idea? A very complicated physiological process in the brain of an animal, the result of which is the consciousness of a *picture* there."

Every perception is acquired. Ideas are the elements of perception. Sensations arouse a train of associated ideas before we rightly perceive an object.

The idea is more or less vivid as attention was directed toward the image as it faded from consciousness. The recalled idea or after-image should be as rich in content as the first image, to be of the highest value. Its characteristics are a pleasure-pain tone and sensory-motor activities.

Things exist outside of my body. They act. Sensations report actions. An isolated sensation has no meaning. It must be combined with other sensations for cognition. Information about an object comes to consciousness by five channels, in the guise of sensations. When the sensations *fuse* we have an *idea* of the object. We could not yet know the object without calling up for comparison previous ideas. This is only possible in the discriminative consciousness, in whose activity all processes take place and are directed.

The *Phædrus* supposed to be Plato's earliest work² sketches the theory of ideas. People seek the field of truth to behold the idea, the pure essence of things.³ This idea is the perfect type which things can only approximate.

Plato rejected art and especially poetry. Ideas lie outside the sphere of knowledge, For ideas to become objects of knowledge the Ego must transcend its individuality.

¹ Schopenhauer, *Sammtliche Werke*, II, XVIII, p. 214.

² Ueberweg, *History of Philosophy*, (tr.) p. III.

³ Plato, *Phædrus*, 60.

Schopenhauer came upon this idea. He found Plato's doctrine of ideas, and Kant's thing-in-itself. He proceeded to connect the two to discover the unknowable. Ideas are eternal, changeless. Kant taught the same thing noumenon. Schopenhauer attended to know these unknowables, and effected a solution. To know brings the world of Idea, pure, and Idea, sensuous, together.

Plato's ideas were no more than Kant's things-in-themselves. Plato viewed from the reality side, and Kant from the side of phenomena.

Plato considered art as merely imitative of what was better expressed in nature. Therefore for him art had no value. Schopenhauer considered it identical with philosophy, and the highest need of man. The aim of philosophy is the exposition of reality. The aim of art is the exhibition of reality.

"But what kind of knowledge is concerned with that which is outside and independent of all relations, that which alone is really essential to the world, the true content of its phenomenon, that which is subject to no change, and therefore is known with equal truth for all time, in a word, the Ideas, which are the direct and adequate objectivity of the thing-in-itself the will? We answer, Art, the work of genius."¹

The source of art is the knowledge of the ideas. Its aim is the communication of this knowledge. It grasps and isolates the Idea from all relations, thus rendering it imperishable.

Only through contemplation can Ideas be apprehended. Genius has unlimited capacity for such Ideas. Imagination is necessary for the genius to construct the perfect Idea, which nature indeed endeavored to make but could not because so much power was wasted in overcoming inferior ideas. Imagination is not genius. Genius must grasp the Idea. Imagination will relate the Idea to other objects or to self. The "plain" man cares only for that which can be related to his own will. The genius dwells on the Idea and ceases to think of his own path in life. He is frequently "absent-minded", often "eccentric", and always "peculiar".

²"*Dass Genialität und Wahnsinn eine Seite haben, wo sie an einander gränzen, ja in einander übergehen, ist oft bemerkt und sogar*

¹ *Schopenhauer Sammtliche Werke*, II, § 36, Bk. 3, p. 217.

² *Schopenhauer, Sammtliche Werke*, II, Bk. 3, § 36, p. 224.

die bichterische Begeisterung eine Art Wahrsinn genannt worden."

Genius then is the capability of relating one's self to the universal, standing here in the actual, time-filled present and stretching forth to an unrelated ideal.

The charming and attractive is to be avoided in art. It is so near the will to excite it and so destroy æsthetic contemplation. Paintings which appeal to the gratification of the senses are to be avoided. The disgusting is also to be shunned. Plastic art brings out Ideas of the lowest grade of objectification of the will. Animal painting and sculpture arouse the interest by giving a glimpse of will. A representation of human beauty is the seizure of the will at the highest stage of objectification. Historical painting reveals character. The summit of art is to show the suppression of will.

Poetry reveals will in the highest grade of its objectification, man, with his emotions and actions. This revelation is direct. Poetry is better than history in presenting a true picture of the struggling will. Tragedy is the highest form of the expression of the will in art. It portrays the misery of the striving human will.

¹*"Daher auch hat es immer geheissen, die Musik sei die Sprache des Gefuhle und der Leidenschaft, so wie Worte die Sprache der Vernunft."*

The first book of the "World as Will and Idea" leaves will master of the intellect. In the third book of this work, intellect frees itself in experience. The theory of art becomes a way of salvation.

Will is identical with the will which appears in the Idea of each grade. There is only the one will. The problems in Book III remain unsolved.

¹ Schopenhauer, *Sammtliche Werke*, II, Bk. 3, § 52, p. 307.

CHAPTER V.

THE RATIONAL WILL.

The rational will, by reason, is self-regulative of impulses. The rational will has shaken off the hampering influence of the sensuous feelings. It governs itself by motives.

Schopenhauer refutes the practical reason of Kant. Kant explained this as the seat of virtue. How far does reason influence action? Kant did not consider that actions arising through mere feeling and emotion were worth much. Those that proceed from an idea of duty in accordance with the categorical imperative were of moral worth.

Rational action and virtuous action are two different things. The ethical systems of the Stoics was a rational attempt to secure happiness. Virtue in it was an accident.

The nature of reality is not determined by reflection, nor by dreams, but only in action and conduct. What must man do? How should he behave in this world? He can act only in accordance with his will.

"And still the real man himself is not the Intellect, but the character—what he wills, and *how* he wills it, as with more or less energy and persistence."

All philosophical endeavor can only exhibit the action of man in its inner nature and conduct. In the highest grade of the objectivity of the will we find individuality, personality. The brute creation does not possess this in such a high degree. Further down is no individuality. In unorganized nature there is no variation in the species.

Motives do not determine the character of a man, but only the phenomenon of his character. Every human character reveals itself, but the phenomenon is in accordance with circumstances.

Man cannot act at one time one way, and at another time differently. This would make will a phenomenon. Knowledge of motives only controls the outward appearance of will. Knowledge cannot affect the will. My character expresses itself under given motives. Will must be the condition and presupposition of every action.

¹"Self-consciousness is not broad enough to give us the exact truth concerning the relation of the particular volition to the motive and the character upon which it depends. While the volition itself is given in self-consciousness, the conditions of the volition are not given. The act of will is first known as a movement of body. There is no possibility of any man's volition being other than it is. The supposed possibility arises from the conflict of motives and desires. Which of the conflicting principles is triumphant can be known only "after the fact of volition".

Every one thinks himself free. The uncultured man defends freedom, but the great thinkers have denied it. Freedom belongs to the thing-in-itself and not to man who is but phenomenon.

Will forever seeks its ends, though improved knowledge may change the course of pursuit.

If the will cannot be changed why do we speak of an *acquired* character? Man must acquire self-knowledge. He learns from experience what he desires and what he can do. He has acquired character when he knows how to will.

Schopenhauer says that virtue cannot be taught. ²"It is a palpable contradiction to call the will free and yet to prescribe laws for it according to which it ought to will. 'Ought to will-wooden iron.'"

The virtues are pity for the suffering of others, aroused by seeing in others the woes we ourselves experience; sympathy; and resignation. Sympathy contains a personal element. Self-abnegation is higher, a renunciation of the world-to-live.

Abstract knowledge of right and wrong can restrict the expression of the will, but cannot change it. Deeds and conduct show the will of man. Knowledge of how to will in accordance with what is good arises rather from a direct intuition than knowledge-processes.

There is a transition from virtue to a ceticism. Man is filled with horror at his existence so full of misery and suffering. He denies his will, kills it, so that when the small residue of will left over as life passes away, his existence has ended forever.

Schopenhauer's essence of the world is given in art. *Æsthetics* supersedes *ethics* in the exposition of the nature of reality.

¹ *Alexander*, *Theories of the Will*, p. 336.

² *Schopenhauer*, *Sammtliche Werke*, II, § 53, p. 321.

There is an intimate relation between æsthetical and ethical feelings or sentiments. In the nature of both, active imagination constructs objects of the "ought-to-be" in place of the existing. The satisfaction of each arises in the contemplation of the ideal.

Schopenhauer considered æsthetics a better teacher of reality, because in æsthetical contemplation the whole life of the will can be pictured from its lowest grade of objectification in nature to the self-consciousness of man. Ethics concerns the individual.

The will which Schopenhauer posits as world-ground is not the will which he describes as everywhere active in nature and the consciousness of man. They cannot be identical. The one is an abstraction. The other we recognize in the activity of our conscious lives, and by analogy, in the activity of other beings and things, out side of self.

There is without doubt an active principle in nature, but it is not Schopenhauer's "blind, bare" will. "But that forces which correlate themselves in kind and degree with one another and which thus manage to construct a unity that is indescribably rich in variety, are significant of One Will, manifesting its immanent ideas in many ways while still retaining its own identity, there can be no manner of doubt,"¹

Is your will free? Is my will free? Is God's will free? These questions arise in consciousness. The "plain" man answers "yes" to all of them.

Every one regards himself as free in particular acts. The "plain" man insists on freedom for his acts. He has the feeling that they are free. Psychology claims freedom for the growth of judgment and reason. Choice seems free.

²"Descriptive and explanatory psychology thus brings us to the place where we have to acknowledge that not something external to consciousness, but something manifesting itself in consciousness, contains the secret of the kind of life the phenomena are, of the course of development which actually takes place."

Schopenhauer holds that the question of freedom does not belong to philosophy. Every action must necessarily occur because it is mechanically known under phenomenal conditions.

¹ Ladd, *A Theory of Reality*, x p. 289.

² Ladd, *Psychology, Descriptive and Explanatory*, p. 638.

There can be only a mechanical explanation of the universe. There is no freedom except in suffering. A power to free himself by denying the will-to-live comes to the moral man. Schopenhauer does not tell us *whence* this power comes. His transcendental freedom cannot have any relation to nature fixed in fate.

Man is under the delusion that he is free. The intellect does not know just which way the *will* will decide when a choice is presented. The intellect places the motives before the will, and waits curiously to see which way the will may decide. The way that the will would decide was predetermined, but the intellect does not know this.

The will in itself is free, original and independent. Acts of self-consciousness are determined, though a free feeling is always the accompaniment.

All that belongs to the phenomenon, all that is object for a knowing subject, is determined by absolute necessity. The thing-in-itself is free, but the content of nature is necessary.

Unter der Regierung der Vernunft dürfen unsere Erkenntnisse überhaupt keine Rhapsodie, sondern sie müssen ein System ausmachen, in welchen sie allein die wesentlichen zwecke derselben unterstützen und beförden können.

—Kant, (Werke, III, 548.)

PART III.

THE OUTCOME OF SCHOPENHAUER'S SYSTEM.

CHAPTER I.

PESSIMISM IN SCHOPENHAUER'S SYSTEM.

Why is it that the world is thoroughly bad? All expressions are between two extremes want and desire, satisfaction and pleasure. Pain is distinctive of life. It is the first condition in which the will objectifies itself. Desire is a matter of of pain.

Pessimism is a doctrine that condemns the world and life as being radically evil. It is not always necessary for the stress to be laid on pain in a pessimistic system. If the ideal cannot be attained because of evil in the world we have pessimism.

Pessimism was first known in Hindu thought. Greek philosophy was only slightly acquainted with the problem of evil. Christianity contains pessimistic tendencies condemning the finite universe. Kant combined ethical optimism with pessimism as far as finite experience was concerned. Schopenhauer affirmed that the evil of all existence is radical. He affiliated with Hindu pessimism.

There is no psychological objection to this pessimistic system of Schopenhauer's. It is founded on feeling, and conditioned by the cravings which accompany or conduce to the activity of the will. The impossibility of reaching a point where the cravings end in satisfaction, gives rise to the pain-theory of the universe.

Pain is one of the conditions of a pessimistic system, pain in one form or other. It is not necessary for a pessimist to believe in the painfulness of conscious existence. If the ideal cannot be realized this also points a pessimistic. The failure to attain satisfactory knowledge is co-ordinated with the painfulness of existence. Schopenhauer's pessimism is not statictical.

The world cannot help being bad. Misery is the constant output.

"The will, as that which is metaphysical, is every where the boundary stone of every investigation, beyond which it cannot go. From the original and unconditioned nature of the will, which has been proved, it is explicable that man loves beyond everything else an existence full of misery, trouble pain and anxiety, and again, full of ennui, which if he considered and weighed it purely objectively, he would certainly abhor, and fears above all all things the end of it, which is yet for him the one thing certain."¹

In Schopenhauer's system, the individual has no place. Everything is for the species. Schopenhauer's will is non-ethical. He sets forth no doctrine of duties. Remorse arises from a dim consciousness of the fact that the injured and injurer are the same. Our own woes pictured in fancy, move us to sympathy with others. For one's self, resignation; for others, pity; these are the virtues. Higher than these is denial of the will-to-live.

Schopenhauer is a good critic of modern ethical development. That is wrong which prevents me from expressing my will

Schopenhauer has two lines of proof as to the world being evil. The will, as thing-in-itself, being a constantly-struggling, never-attaining-complete satisfaction factor to be considered, and the misery and suffering that we see in the world, the direct expression of the blindly-desirous will.

The individual does not count. There is no sort of an individual appeal. Nature is for the species only. The will-to-live is the expression of the inmost nature of the world. Everything is anxious to preserve its existence. Man, above all things, fears to die, though his life here is but a succession of torments. Organized nature has but one intention, that is, to preserve the species. To this end is all the fearful struggle. There is no proportion between the cares and troubles of life and the results or gain of it. Nature prepares all this suffering without the aid of man. The simple life of the brute creation reveals want and suffering. They are tortured within by their desires, preyed upon with increased torture by their enemies. Their lives are but analogous to ours. Life is a task, a "drudgery" to be performed. The daily papers teem with accounts of the

¹ *Schopenhauer Werke*, III, p. 409.

misery in the world. The innocent suffer with the guilty. The groans of the multitude ascend.

Schopenhauer has not yet told us what the world is. Until he can establish conclusively the reality of the world, he has no right to apply the concepts good or evil. We must know what the world is; then we can determine the value.

Pessimistic views are harmful. If the world is so wholly miserable, it is not worth while to soothe suffering for so brief a period. Pain is constantly recurring. Man is therefore under no obligation to help his neighbor.

Such a view stunts moral growth. Seize what pleasure you can, and enjoy it while it lasts.

Pessimism conduces to selfishness. Misery is universal, and happiness is brief. Therefore one is justified in disregarding the claims and sufferings of others in the pursuit of happiness.

Willing is not necessarily painful. There is pleasure in putting forth a certain amount of activity.

CHAPTER II.

PANTHEISM IN SCHOPENHAUER'S SYSTEM.

There are tendencies to be pantheistic in Greek thought; scholastic thought. In Descartes are germs of pantheism. Spinoza expressed pantheism. Reality is one substance; objects are modifications of its essence posited in it. Fichte had an ethical pantheism. Schelling is the best representative of pantheism. Schopenhauer makes will to be the one reality. According to Lotze the world is a unitary system which excludes isolated processes.

The world is the sum of all realities. One substance originally contained everything. This one substance was potentially the universe. It was both the matter and the creative force. The world came into being. The world will return to the unity of the real substance. There is no distinction between God and the world.

The psychological basis for such a system of pantheism is Schopenhauer's view of consciousness, or rather unconsciousness.

The inner nature of all phenomena is one and the same. All these so-diversified phenomena are but the manifestations of one being, which is so lost in its appearances that it does not even recognize itself. This inner being presents itself to self-consciousness as will. Every one knows one being his own will in self-consciousness. Other things he knows by analogy. There is only one being, and simple consciousness discovers it. The lowest forces of nature are animated by this one will, and afterwards intelligence, created by will, and through and through nothing but will, wonders at its own work. The light of nature is directed outward so that all things become clearer on the objective stage. The interior is dark, and there exist places that knowledge cannot reach. Consciousness is only possible where the true being runs out into the phenomenon.

Schopenhauer's posited will is an abstraction. As such it is pure being. Being is measured solely by activity. This will is not an agent. It is not active. Only that which acts is considered as existing. Therefore Schopenhauer's will is pure being, which is impossible.

¹"Pure being is objectively nothing; and even if it were a possible existence, we could neither reach nor use it without bad logic. Only the definite can found the definite."

Pure being does not exist. Being and action are co-existent.
²"When we grasp this fact it becomes clear that being must be viewed as essentially causal and active; for any other conception makes it inadequate to its function."

The interconnection of things can only be understood by assuming that they are parts of a unitary being. Unity is the precondition of pantheism. Each process in the world is related to all other processes.

*"The hypothesis of self-creation, which practically amounts to what is called Pantheism," cannot be represented in thought.
 *"Really to conceive self-creation, is to conceive potential existence passing into actual existence by some inherent necessity; which we cannot do." Potential existence cannot become actual existence.

There must be a logical relation between pessimism and pantheism. If there is no relation Schopenhauer's system falls to the ground. Pessimism must be regarded as pantheistic. The world-ground is evil. It is the manifestation of this evil world-principle that makes the world miserable. Pessimism and pantheism hang together. Pantheism may be optimistic, but pessimism must be pantheistic.

In a pantheistic belief there is difficulty in doing justice to the claims of morality, and in vindicating the existence of moral responsibility. There is only one power everywhere active. Hence there cannot be freedom of the will, and there is no responsibility. Reality unfolds from inner necessity.

In a pantheistic system our concept of personality is too narrow to apply to the Absolute. There is no personal; self-conscious God. I am a self, because there exists a not-self to inhibit my action, but for the pantheistic absolute there is no object to place over against subject. All is subject. There is only such a personal relation as that of the nation to the individual.

¹ *Bowne*, *Metaphysics*, p. 14.

² *Id.* p. 17.

* *Spencer*, *First Principles*, p. 33.

Pantheism supports Schopenhauer's æsthetical theory of art. Every art leads back to one and the same will. In æsthetics Schopenhauer gives us a glimpse of the will, reality. Thus æsthetics conduces to the end for which philosophy strives, the exhibition of reality. Pantheism is a metaphysics. It is a form of philosophical thought promoting being. Æsthetics deduces being and presents it to consciousness. Its method is deductive. The pantheistic method is inductive. The evolution of the pantheistic absolute is a growth in consciousness.

Schopenhauer's æsthetics opens up the way for escape from suffering by denial of the will-to-live.

Art and philosophy work to the same ends. The aim of each of the exposition of the essence of things. The essence of the world consists in beauty. Art expresses reality by means of ideas.

In renouncing the will-to-live, Schopenhauer does not posit any aim for such self-surrender. Man develops by more than mere pleasure-pain feelings, so that it is not necessary to emphasize pain. There is pleasure in definite activity. Pains and pleasures are not all of life. Man develops in terms of feeling that are more than mere pleasures and pains. There is more than pleasure and pain in feeling.

¹"It is quite wrong, however, to call pain and pleasure ideas, for they are by no means ideas, but immediate affections of the will in its manifestations, the body: compulsory, instantaneous willing, or not-willing of the impression the body sustains."

That pain and pleasure belong to the will is a philosophical truth.

²"Our starting-point lies in the conception of mental activity, as the direction of mental process towards an end. The end is attained when the process works itself out to a conclusion, and so ceases."

This view is Stout's. He considers feelings pleasurable in proportion to their intensity and unimpeded progress towards the end. They are painful as they are retarded or prevented from reaching their goal. They are inseparably associated with activity. A pain of bereavement is thwarted activity. He denies that there are any neutral feelings.³

¹ Schopenhauer, *Sammtliche Werke*, II, § 18, p. 120.

² Stout, *Analytic Psychology*, p. 270.

³ *Id.* p. 288.

A pleasure-pain theory makes pleasures and pains the measure of feeling. They can be nothing more than so much pleasure and so much pain. Dr. Ladd ¹objects to this view. Feeling is more than pleasure or pain. If they could be so graded they would be only greater or less, instead of known as "noble" or "base". They show actual qualitative differences. Pleasures and pains are different kinds of feeling.

There are neutral feelings. Under the law of habit, feelings can lose tone and become neutral.

Feelings are very important for the development of mental life. They differ qualitatively. If they were only amounts of more or less they would not be so valuable. ²"We believe that not even the simplest and rudest psychological development, the lowest and meanest exhibition of so-called human nature, can be explained as due to the mere repulsion of pain and the allurements of pleasure."

¹ *Ladd, Psychology, Descriptive and Explanatory*, p. 168.

² *Id.* p. 188.

CHAPTER III.

SCHOPENHAUER'S IDEALISM.

Other systems start from either object or subject, but Schopenhauer's starts from neither. He makes the idea which is the first fact in consciousness, the starting-point. Man, as a thinking being, stands alone on one of the rapidly revolving, shining spheres in space. He has sprung forth from the moldy film on the surface. This world vanishes as his idea. It exists only in actual consciousness. The objective and subjective worlds are cast in one form—the intellect. "Thus true philosophy must always be idealistic; indeed, it must be so in order to be merely honest."

No man ever came forth from his prison to view objects face to face, but his own consciousness is the ground of all knowledge.

A system which starts from the object fails to consider that object is dependent upon a subject, whose ideas they are. The world is but a phenomenon and vanishes with the brain.

Objective existence does not depend upon *one* knowing subject, but upon some knowing subjects. Man's existence depends upon the knowing Ego as apart from the willing Ego, and this knowing Ego can never be found as an object in consciousness.

The order of the universe is given by the knowing subject, by the forms of knowledge, space, time and causality. Things are conditioned by the Intellect. Take every being out of the world and leave only unorganized nature. Then add one person and the whole world is conditioned in space and time.

The law of causality is the bridge between the subject and object. If it belongs to object then it cannot prove the reality of the objective world. It belongs to the subject, and applies only to phenomena.

All philosophical systems must start from immediate awareness. Schopenhauer starts with the Idea. Idealism sees in things a product of consciousness. The principle of idealism is self-consciousness. Ideas are only phenomena, objects for the knowing Ego, determined by the forms of that Ego, space and time, and connected the thought-principle of causality. There are two kinds of ideas, ideas of perception and abstract

ideas, or concepts. The forms of perception are space and time. The perception-ideas form the visible world which the scientists investigate. Matter is given by the union of space and time by the law of causality supplied by the understanding. Body is given as Idea. It is not known through feeling, and has no significance for the will.

The intellect being of only secondary consideration in Schopenhauer's system, we can only approximate the direction his epistemology would take.

¹Paulsen arranges epistemological problems somewhat as follows: what is knowledge? Realism answers. Whence comes knowledge? Idealism answers. What is knowledge? Sensationalism answers. How is it acquired? Rationalism answers.

Realism says that knowledge is a copy of reality. The idea and the object are the same, except that the idea has no corporeality. Realism leads to materialism. If perception gives us things as they exist independently of our knowledge, experience gives the order of things. Idealism says that thoughts are different from things. If they are to be identified, the things lose their corporeality and become ideas. According to sensationalism, knowledge springs from perception. Rationalism says that reason is necessary. Knowledge springs from *a priori* principles.

Things exist and we know them by perception, (Realistic empiricism, or sensationalism). This is the crude common-sense view. Things exist and we know them by reason, (Realistic rationalism). Things exist, but not for our knowledge, (Idealistic empiricism). Things exist and we know them by reason, in their forms only. (Idealistic rationalism.)

Kant's view approximates the thought given as idealistic, rationalistic, but Kant did not go as far as idealism permits. Idealistic rationalism can be expressed differently. Things are but ideas. We know them by reason. This then is Schopenhauer's epistemological stand-point. However, he introduces so many contradictions; that there is difficulty in saving his idealism from destruction.

The idea in the first book of the "World as Will and Idea," is different from the idea in the third book of the same work.

¹ Paulsen, Introduction to Philosophy, (tr.) p. 341.

Mr. Spencer shows how impossible it is for us to know such a Being. Knowledge cannot extend beyond phenomena, yet in its struggle to pass the bounds of the finite, it leaves a trace in consciousness which results in a belief in an actuality beyond appearance.

In Schopenhauer's expressed views he finds no use for an Absolute. Reason does not seek to return to an unconditioned cause. The Brahmins and Buddhists condition the series of phenomena to infinity. It is a mistake to extend causality to the inner nature of all things, and to ask for a cause of the world itself. We stop at a first cause and make the world begin in time which has no beginning. ¹"In general, then the law of causality applies to all things in the world, but not to the world itself, for it is *immanent* in the world, not *transcendent*; *with* it it comes into action and *with* it it is abolished."

Our forms of knowledge are adapted to phenomena alone. If a higher Being came and explained His nature we could not comprehend. ²"Those, therefore, who profess to know the ultimate, i. e. the first ground of things, thus a primordial being, an absolute, or whatever else they choose to call it, together with the process, the reasons, motives, or whatever else it may be, in consequence of which the world arises from it, or spring, or falls, or is produced set in existence, discharged, and ushered forth, are playing tricks, are vain boasters, when indeed they are not charlatans."

The Absolute which is not so-called by Schopenhauer is will. It is his world-ground. It is a universal principle unfolding itself according to its inner necessity.

The preceding views have shown the impossibility of reaching a conception of an Absolute. Prof. Ladd does not posit a dreary emptiness towards which all things point, and into which all things finally take a tumble. "The Being of the World, of which all particular beings are but parts, must then be so conceived of as that in it can be found the One Ground of all interrelated existences and activities." The Life of a self-conscious will and Mind is the Ultimate Ground. The knowledge of the Self and its relation to objects gives us a clue to the nature of the Being of the World.

¹ *Schopenhauer Werke*, III, p. 51.

² *Schopenhauer Werke*, III, p. 206.

What would be the content of a pantheistic Absolute? In pantheism we have no desires, no will, nothing outside to act on. Our self-consciousness is determined by the opposition between the Ego and the World. How then could the Absolute be self-conscious? It could not find self without reaction from a not-self. We approach the nature of the Absolute by bestowing upon it such terms and attributes as we apply to a man, though we should not ascribe our attributes to the infinite. Our inner psychical life is too limited a conception to project into the World-Being. Human views are too narrow. God is in all things, all thoughts, all feeling, good and bad, for pantheism rules out the distinction between good and evil. Here then is a pantheistic conception of the Absolute. All realities equal the world. God is both the matter and force of the world. Therefore God and the world are one.

However, thought inclines to a personal world-ground, with all things dependent on a self-existent Being.

Birth and death belong merely to the phenomenon. It does not matter if the individual passes away. Nature cares only for the species. Man carries about him the certainty of death. If this were a distinct idea, he would feel like a condemned criminal. The fear of death arises from a recognition that it is the end of the temporal phenomenon, the end of the individual.

Death is always regarded as a great evil. The attachment to life is irrational and blind, therefore, as this is the will to live, this will is irrational and blind. Knowledge discloses the worthlessness of life, and man faces death courageously.

Death concerns the consciousness, alone. It is akin to sleep. It is sleep for the species, and "this is nature's great doctrine of immortality, which seeks to teach us that there is no radical difference between sleep and death, but the one endangers existence just as little as the other." The *individual* sinks into nothingness, but the will remains and is potentially *many individuals*.

"Lo! in my heart I hear, as in a shell

The murmur of a world beyond the grave,

Distinct, distinct, though faint and far it be;

CHAPTER V.

A CRITICISM OF SCHOPENHAUER'S DOCTRINE OF REALITY WITH A VIEW TO EXPOSING HIS INCONSISTENCIES.

Consciousness is a fruit or product of the organism. The intellect is secondary, a mere tool in the service of the will. Going down the scale, the intellect becomes weaker with the lower grade of manifestation, but the will remains the same. The intellect is secondary, yet it has an influence upon the will. "Indeed the intellect makes the will play the part of a child which is alternately thrown at pleasure into joyful or sad moods by the chatter and tales of its nurse." The will can control the intellect, and inhibit certain trains of ideas that would call forth too powerful emotions. ²"*In Wahrheit aber ist treffendeste Gleichniss für das Verhältniss Beider der starke Blinde, der den sehenden Gelahmten auf den Schultern trägt.*"

The intellect destined originally for the service of the will may become free from the tyrant. When the subject ceases to be individual and withdraws into the calm realm of the Concepts, and resigns interest in the practical content of Percepts, intellect is free from the will. Genius then contemplates, not indeed things which have existence and their relations, but only the ideas of such things. Schopenhauer says that all men in a more or less degree are able to withdraw from the practical realm, and to contemplate the pure Idea.

The will alone is primary and essential. Knowledge is secondary, artificial and accidental. The pantheistic ground leaves no room for a theory of knowledge. All is one Knowledge exists by differentiation.

The essence of life is unsatisfied purpose. The end is disappointment. This is the keynote of our authors pessimism. Death, with annihilation is the only good thing to which we may look forward. Blessed are the dead. They cannot will.

The will is what other metaphysicians call soul. Immortality is its right, but personal identity is not continued. For this man should be thankful. To know after death would be to suffer. Death ends all suffering.

¹ *Schopenhauer Sammtliche Werke*, III, p. 235.

² *Id.* p. 233.

The psychological basis of pessimism is found in feeling. Schopenhauer's pantheism grows out of unconscious will. Some form of consciousness is therefore, at the base of pantheism. Subject is allowed only a momentary glimpse of its environment.

"A moment guess'd—then back behind the fold

Immerst of Darkness round the Drama roll'd

Which, for the Pastime of Eternity,

He doth Himself contrive enact, behold."

Schopenhauer bases his idealistic system of philosophy on consciousness. If he could raise the foundation of his metaphysics to spontaneous self-consciousness, there would be fewer internal contradictions in his system. He sinks into "unconsciousness" which can not be anything for practical psychology or metaphysics. Schopenhauer would probably say: the unconsciousness that I have in mind is potentially consciousness, and not an existent Nothing.

The Absolute of Hegel was determined by thought. Schopenhauer's Absolute was blind, unconscious will, out of which all things came, and into which all things vanished. Mr. Spencer says that, there is a dim consciousness of the Absolute that cannot be expressed. It is sufficient to arouse a feeling of belief, but strong enough for cognition. It is an unknown reality in which all relations are lost. Bradley's Absolute is a logical unknown. Ladd's Absolute is self-consciousness projected.

What is an absolute? ¹"As an idea or series of mental representations, it is the product of man's active imagination and intellect functioning in time. And as actual, it must be regarded as the product of some cause or system of causes, in order that it may originate at all."

Schopenhauer considers it unnecessary to serve up covered dishes of "absolutes" and "infinities". The world of reality outspread before us, affords sufficient material for consideration.

From the time primitive man awakened from the long sleep of the animal ages, he has been searching for the Creator of the Universe.

"What art Thou, Mighty One, and where Thy seat?

Thou broodest on the calm that cheers the lands,

And Thou dost bear within Thine awful hands

The rolling thunders and the lightnings fleet."

¹ *Ladd Theory of Reality*, ch. VIII. p. 208.

In the first book, Schopenhauer is an idealist, but he tends to become a realistic materialist, by identifying brain and consciousness. The idea in the first book is psychological. It is merely the representative image in perception. The idea in the third book is metaphysical. It is an abstraction. It cannot become an object of knowledge. It is will at the very stage of objectification, and it is *felt* rather than *sensed*.

The idealistic train of thought is essential to Schopenhauer's pantheistic system. ¹"The nature of reality, as it exists in and for itself, manifests itself in the inner world, which, to tell the truth, is immediately given to us only at one point, in self-consciousness. Outside of that, we reach it by interpretation, which is always uncertain, and beyond the animal world we must depend on analogy and on an idealistic symbolism. The corporeal world is at bottom but an accidental concept, an inadequate representation of existence in our sensibility."

1 *Paulsen*, Introduction to Philosophy, (tr.) 110.

CHAPTER IV.

THE FATE OF THE THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE IN SCHOPENHAUER'S SYSTEM.

Schopenhauer is very weak in his theory of knowledge. This shows in the first book of his principal work, "*Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung*."

The will is unconscious. It manifested itself nature and intelligence was not needed. The organisms were simple. As the organism became more complex the will created the intellect to guide the organism in search of food and the gratification of its cravings. Knowledge therefore was a mere accident in the manifestation of a blind will. It developed with the complexity of the organisms until it reach its utmost capacity in the reasoning self-consciousness of man.

Knowledge is completely under the bondage of will. Any freedom that it may assume is but a delusion and a snare. However, we of a more modern time, cannot accept a theory that makes knowledge but a mechanical adjustment, If there is freedom in knowledge, there is also freedom in reality.

Schopenhauer allows freedom of the intellect only to the individual who has raised himself above all willing; who has sublimated himself and arrived as the subject of all knowing before the throne of the eternal ideas.

Pure will-less knowledge is not different from conceptual knowledge. One theory of knowledge must solve all the problems. Either there is "one world in one knowledge or no world in no knowledge."

The epistemological objections to pantheism are the disappearance of the finite, and the removal of differences, on both of which knowledge depends.

The will is knowledge-less, yet as the pantheistic world ground it makes draughts on a theory of knowledge. Consciousness supports Schopenhauer's pantheism. Our author was the first thinker to combine a theory of knowledge and a metaphysics with pessimism. He read his own nature into the world.

Schopenhauer did not evolve deity from his pantheistic conception of the universe. To do so he would be obliged to transcend experience.

Thou fool! this echo is a cheat as well,—
 The hum of earthly instincts; and we crave
 A world as unreal as the shell-heard sea."

Man as an individual ends with death, but individuality is a mere appearance of the will-to-live, which is the true essence. Individuality is in time, but in an unconscious condition there is no measure of time. Existence belongs to the will, but individualities are indifferent to the will-to-live.

"O threats of Hell and Hopes of Paradise!
 One thing at least is certain—*This* Life flies;
 One thing is certain and the rest is Lies;
 The flower that once has blown forever dies."

Schopenhauer meets with a difficulty in solving the problem of immortality. Self-determination is the only reality, yet consciousness of identity is left obscure. Will is the essence of life and of the world. Consciousness is the product of its activity, and will ever accompany will. This bears on identity after death.

Sleep on great Schopenhauer, most miserable exponent of your own sad system. You cannot wake to glory in the harvest of the seed you sowed. When your body descended to form the dusty couch of mankind, your will violently put out the offending eye of intellect. For you there can come again no knowledge of self as self.

The life of consciousness is in thought-processes. There is no object without subject, no subject without object. Hence a knowledge of pure subject is impossible. "*Die Intelligenz gleicht der Sonne, welche den Raum nicht erleuchtet, wenn nicht ein Gegenstand da ist, von dem ihre Strahlen zuruckgeworfen werden. Das Erkennende selbst kann, eben als solches, nicht erkannt werden: sonst ware es das Erkannte eines andern Erkennenden.*"¹

Here we have Schopenhauer, the agnostic. We can never possess a knowledge of the Ego. Knowledge of that which knows can never be obtained, but knowledge of that which wills is constantly at hand. The two are identical but the identity cannot be reduced to terms of knowledge.

Just as Schopenhauer's consciousness of the identity of the

¹ Schopenhauer, *Werke*, III, p. 225.

knowing and willing ego is faulty, so is his idea of a world-ground. His will is not causal, and to explain the world-system, we do not need an immaterial substance like "unconscious will," but that which manifests its existence by its activity. "The infinite then, is not to be viewed as a passive substance but as a unitary and indivisible agent."

Wherever Schopenhauer expresses *will* it would be possible to substitute absolute mind, self-conscious, active will as a world-ground. "That the world-ground must be conceived as free and active intelligence is the result to which thought continually comes, whatever the line of investigation. If we seek a tenable theory of knowledge we find it only as we reach a basal intelligence. If we seek to find the many together in an all-embracing system, it is possible only in and through intelligence. If we seek for unity in being itself we find it only in intelligence. If we would give any account of the intelligible order and purpose-like products of the world, again intelligence is the only key. If finally we ask for the formal conditions of reality we find them in intelligence. The attempt to define reality itself fails until intelligence is introduced as its constitutive condition. The mind can save its own categories from disappearing, can realize its own aims and tendencies, can truly comprehend or even mean anything, only as it relates everything to free intelligence as the source and administrator of the system."²

In the system of Leibnitz the mechanical and teleological view of the universe is harmonious. Every event conforms to the purposes of the Infinite. The organization and course of the world is anticipated and directed by Intelligence. Such a world as ours can not be conceived of as resulting from chance or blind law. This same teleological conception of nature was handed down from Anaxagoras, meeting with opposition from time to time, as the stirring of scientific investigation made itself felt, but coming out triumphant with Leibnitz.

In accordance with a pantheistic system the place of teleology is in the noumenon. Hence Schopenhauer's teleology, if anywhere, would be in unconscious will. A theistic system would make teleology phenomenal, the design being worked out with phenomena.

¹ Bowne, *Metaphysics*, V. p. 94.

² Bowne, *Metaphysics*, V. p. III.

Schopenhauer has no teleology. He did not admit that purpose was the established law of things. His will energizing in things carries out its own nature. There is no beginning, no purpose, no ending. Final cause is no cause.

Schopenhauer's views have been exposed to the criticism of more modern authors throughout this study, so that a detailed comparison is not necessary.

It is evident that Dr. Ladd's view of will as a world ground is quite different from the "bare, blind" will of Schopenhauer. That the "forces that correlate themselves in kind and degree with one another, and which thus manage to construct a unity that is indescribably rich in variety, are significant of One Will, manifesting its immanent ideas in many ways while still retaining its own identity, there can be no manner of doubt."¹

Wundt² defines two views of psychology, "intellectualistic," and "voluntaristic." The intellectualistic view went as far as to make the objects of the outer sense, images of the inner sense, so that the qualities ascribed to the external objects were transferred to the objects of the "inner sense," ideas. Then ideas became things, making their appearance in consciousness only when stimulated by the outer sense.

³"In all these respects *voluntaristic psychology* is opposed to intellectualism. While the latter assumes an inner sense and specific objects of inner experience, voluntarism is closely related to the view that inner experience, is identical with *immediate* experience."

A psychological experience is all that makes up the process of experience. All "Psychological facts are occurrences." Volitions are typical for all psychoses. "Voluntaristic psychology does not by any means assert that volition is the only real form of psychosis, but merely that, with its closely related feelings and emotions, it is just as essential a component of psychical experience as sensation and ideas."⁴

The trend of psychology is voluntaristic. This has no connection with a metaphysical doctrine of the will, such as Schopenhauer's. "Indeed, it stands in opposition to Schopenhauer's

¹ Ladd, A Theory of Reality, X, p. 289.

² Wundt, Outlines of Psychology, (tr.) p. 13 § 2.

³ *Id.* p. 14f. § 2.

⁴ Wundt, Outlines of Psychology, (tr.) p. 15.

one-sided voluntarism, which derived all being from a transcendental original will."¹

Psychology has not yet recovered from the influence of the deep-rooted abstract doctrine of the will. Many modern philosophers and psychologists, following Schopenhauer, considering will in itself "unconscious" manifesting itself in the volitional act. *La mas necesaria de de todas las ciencias es la de saber olvidar lo malo que una vez as aprendio.* (The most necessary of all the sciences is to know how to forget the evil that at one time we learned.)—Aristoteles.

¹ *Wundt*, Outlines of Psychology, (tr.) p. 195, § 14.

APPENDIX.

THE IMPORTANCE OF WILL FROM THE STANDPOINT
OF SCHOPENHAUER.

THE IMPORTANCE OF WILL FROM THE STANDPOINT OF SCHOPENHAUER.

What am I? Whence did I come? This source of my power, what has it in common with the ruling forces of the universe? These are but the natural inquiries of every thinking man. Usually he satisfies himself by believing his physical part to be the endowment of a long line of ancestors headed by Adam and Eve, and his soul a special gift of the Creator. Or he accepts his body as a donation from a line of ancestry commencing with protozoa and leaving the brute kingdom with monkey. In this case he rarely troubles himself about the origin of his soul. He is an automaton, his fine nervous organism responding to every stimulus in the outer world. Man knows he is, and that he is impelled to be up and doing. What he is and what urges him on, he cannot explain. He pictures self as a pale ghost propelling the body. It seems almost too much to say that this wonderful motor force within ourselves is identical with the great world powers, but one day in the history of philosophy a philosopher appeared who stated that fact in the voluminous writings of "Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung," (The World as Will and Idea).

To solve the great problem it is not necessary to discover one's own nature but to be satisfied that it is a common one with the world-ground. That of which I am the expression must be in you and in the wide universe.

Look into your nature and you will find yourself to be a *willing* subject. The philosopher referred to above said there was only will in the world. He was convinced that if man could grasp the idea that he was himself through and through will, he would also see will inanimate and in animate nature. Knowledge, upon which we human beings pride ourselves, is but a temporary affair and the outgrowth of the will. Feeling is also, derived from this wonderful source.

I find something within me that is constantly struggling to express itself. There are wants, wants to be appeased, and every expression of my conscious or unconscious life is the satisfaction of a controlling power within. This persistent voice is the will. The impulse to activity is co-etaneous with life.

Only that which is active, which exerts some effect on its environment is real. To live therefore, is to be active, to influence

Let us consider the will-philosopher's view. There is nothing but will, which by its nature is ceaselessly struggling to express itself. The universe exists potentially in a blind unconscious will. Then comes the expression of the will in the flaming universe, revolving worlds, cooling planets, the earth. The vapor thins; the sun shines on a vast sea; land appears; things live. Everything is the One Will outwardly manifesting itself. There is no intelligence in the universe, only blind force. Each non-sentient thing fights and struggles to preserve and perpetuate its Idea or Grade of existence, its outward expression. As the organisms increase in perplexity, willing and feeling are not sufficient for the maintenance of the individual and the propagation of the species. It becomes necessary for the organism to will with an end in view, so a dim awareness of motive is added, from which intelligence evolves in the higher brutes and man. In the æons that have passed since this sleep of the animal ages man has evolved to a plane where there is a great divorce between the intellect and the will, so that he does not know his own nature, and is often surprised by his actions, springing from a source of which he knows nothing, his will.


He who would rise above crude metaphysics must inquire as to the relation of his inner personality to the motive power of the world. The will theory as it stands is flimsy enough to sift straws through, but it is a view-point, and opens up avenues of thought. It is better than passive acceptance of facts. Examine the foundation of your beliefs and you will find them crude and contradictory.

The will created its intellect, made the mirror in which it views itself. Henceforth, we have an intelligent, will, moving with a knowledge of ends.

To understand the will with its strong hereditary bent is but to carry out the admonition of Socrates, "Know thyself". In the act of choosing, the intellect presents two or more ways wise or agreeable, and waits. We are often surprised at the ultimate choice, which is the decision of the will, based on its strong hereditary tendency. Learn the ancestral history of your will and study its present idiosyncrasies that you, by a more en-

lightened consciousness of ends, or by a more delicately organized conscience, may guide it into channels leading to the highest happiness of yourselves and others. By contact with the many-sided environment of an old world civilization grow to have other ends than those of physical enjoyment.

A selfish and base person is one whose animal nature has come almost intact from remote ages, uninfluenced by a guiding intellect. When one rises above the gratification of self he becomes a noble character. His will has been directly or indirectly brought under the influence of the great picture-gallery of life, valuable world literature, and in the contemplation of beautiful ideals, of complete living all self-seeking has vanished, and all energies developed towards high aims, more or less capable of realization.



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